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ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates short- and long-tenn academic effects of the US School Breakfast Program
(SBP). The paper divides into four sections: an introduction (page 4), a literature review (page
11), a statistical model (page 31), and an empirical model (page 38). In the first section, we cover
general facts and details about the SBP. In the second section, we first review literature relevant
to the SBP (supply, demand, and short-tenn effects studies). Next, we explore studies of the
long-term effects of schooling and of school quality. Many of the techniques and infonnation
from these studies relate to our discussion of long-tenn effects of the SBP. In the third section,
we fonnalize our argument that the SBP exercises short- and long-tenn effects on students'
perfonnance. Our discussion of the statistical model follows the fonnat of the flow chart on page
86. In the fourth section, we empirically test the hypotheses that the SBP improves students'
attendance and expected education levels. We use pooled statewide aggregate data to measure
attendance rates, and we use cross-sectional longitudinal data to measure education levels. We
find that the SBP does raise attendance and education levels. We are able to quantify the
attendance effect and decompose it into two separate effects. We are not able to quantify the
effect on educational attainment, but we do find a lower bound for the SBP's effect on high
school graduation. Given this lower bound, we are able to calculate a lower bound for the income
)

effect of the SBP. We compare our calculated income effect with two possible alternatives. We
find that a dollar spent on the SBP yields a substantially higher return than the 10-year Treasury
Bill interest rate. We also find that, dollar for dollar, the SBP's income effect rivals Card and
Krueger's estimated income effect for classroom size reduction. We do not find convincing
evidence that this return can be achieved by indiscriminately increasing the number of SBP
participants. These findings indicate that recent efforts to expand the SBP through universal free
breakfasts could be better directed. Indiscriminate expansion of the SBP does earn a fairly high
return. Nevertheless, our research suggests that selective expansion of the SBP could capitalize
on significantly higher economic returns.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1998, 17% of US students participated in the US School Breakfast Program (SBP). In the
same year, 57% of US schools participated, and the federal government spent $1.3 billion on the
program. Last year, Congress passed a pilot program to provide free breakfasts to all interested
students living in certain school districts. Recently, lawmakers introduced a bill to Congress to
provide free breakfasts to all students in US schools K-12. The program would cost $400 million
a year. 1

The SBP is gaining political momentum despite relatively little feedback about the nationwide
impacts of the program. The SBP purports to improve students' nutrition, eating habits,
attendance, and learning abilities. School-wide studies have demonstrated that the SBP improves
children's health, behavior, attendance, and some forms of academic performance. No studies
have demonstrated lasting effects of the program past a single semester. A recent study of US
schools showed that the SBP increases the probability that low-income children eat healthful
breakfasts. 2 No nationwide studies have demonstrated academic effects of the program.
Economists have demonstrated that school quality variables significantly affect student's years of
education and their earnings. Our empirical model draws from these studies.

This paper consists offour sections. First, we include an introduction to provide a general
background of understanding about the SBP. Second, we review literature written on the SBP to
establish what aspects of the SBP researchers have studied and what they have shown. Third, we
construct a statistical model to formalize our argument that the SBP exercises long-term effects
on students' academic and labor market performance. Fourth, we construct and test two
empirical models. Our first empirical model tests the hypothesis that SBP participation improves
student attendance. Our second empirical model tests the hypothesis that SBP in the elementary
school years raises students' expected education levels. We find that the SBP does raise
attendance and education levels. We are able to quantify the attendance effect and we decompose
it into two separate effects. We are not able to quantify the effect on educational attainment, but
we do find a lower bound for the SBP's effect on high school graduation. Given this lower
bound, we calculate a lower bound for the income effect of the SBP. We compare our calculated
income effect with two possible alternatives. We find that a dollar spent on the SBP yields a

1

2

Associated Press, "Government Plans .. ."
Devaney and Stuart. 1998.
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substantially higher return than the lO-year Treasury Bill interest rate. We also find that, dollar
for dollar, the SBP's income effect rivals Card and Krueger's estimated income effect for
classroom size reduction. We do not find convincing evidence that this return can be achieved by
indiscriminately increasing the number of SBP participants. These findings indicate that recent
efforts to expand the SBP through universal free breakfasts could be better directed.
Indiscriminate expansion of the SBP does earn a fairly high return. Nevertheless, our research
suggests that selective expansion of the SBP could capitalize on significantly higher economic
returns.

Long-term student effects of the SBP rely on a cause-and-effect chain. Schools mayor may not
offer the SBP to students. Given school SBP availability, students mayor may not participate.
SBP participants eat different breakfasts than they would eat at home. The SBP raises
participants' morning and daily nutrient intakes. Because SBP participants eat better, their brains
and bodies function more efficiently, they do not get distracted by hunger. The SBP gives
students an incentive to come to school; participants are less likely to arrive late or to skip school.
To the extent that the SBP improves participants' health, participants are less likely to miss
school due to illness. As the SBP improves participants' health, participants' cognitive functions
and emotional health may improve. Participants' academic performance may improve. These
academic improvements may lead SBP participants to attend school longer. Because they may
learn better in school and they may attend school longer, SBP participants may earn higher
incomes because of the program. To better understand the chain of student effects, consult Figure
2 on page 86.

SBP Background

All US schools, K-12, public or private, may receive federal reimbursements for providing school
breakfasts. In order to receive reimbursement, schools must offer breakfast to every interested
student. USDA reimbursement rates depend on the income ofthe student who purchases the
breakfast. This section briefly describes the SBP's history, program goals, levels of availability
and eligibility, and the provisions of the program.

Program History

6

Federally sponsored school lunches began during the Great Depression. The government sought
to feed children, to provide a market for US agricultural products, and to create cafeteria jobs.
World War II revived legislative interest in school lunches for two reasons. First, WWII draft
offices had turned away a number of malnourished young men. This phenomenon brought
malnutrition to national attention. Second, women's employment opportunities improved during
the war, and the opportunity cost of preparing home lunches rose? Congress passed the National
School Lunch Act (NSLA), instating the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), in 1946. In
the Act, Congress asserted two goals:
"To safeguard the health and well-being of the nation' s children, and to expand the
market for nutritious agricultural commodities.'"

Throughout the 1950's, many lower income students and schools did not participate in the NSLP
because they could not afford the lunches. In the early 1960's, as part of Johnson's War on
Poverty, Congress passed special assistance legislation for schools to offer free and reduced-price
lunches to low income students.s Congress changed this special assistance to permanent funding
in 1972.6

The Child Nutrition Act (CNA) of 1966 restated the goals of the NSLA and set out to better
achieve those goals. In order to do so, the CNA expanded the NSLP and created a number of
new pilot programs, including the SBP. Congress renewed the temporary program in 1968, 1971,
and 1972, and they voted in 1975 to make the SBP permanent.

In the early years of the program, policymakers noted that many farm children ate breakfast early
and worked before school. These children were hungry again by the time they arrived at school?
Unlike the NSLP, the SBP targets both "low income areas and areas where children have to travel
a great distance to school.',g The 1975 amendment to the CNA added the goal that the SBP "be
made available in all schools where it is needed to provide adequate nutrition for children in
attendance.,,9

103 rd Congress Pages 63-64.
rd
4 103 Congress. Page 3.
rd
5 103 Congress. Page 64.
6 103rd Congress. Page 3.
7 Devaney and Stuart.
s Bu~ardt and Devaney. Page 178(S) (Quotation not cited). 103 rd Congress. Pages 84-85.
9 103 Congress. Page 86.
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The USDA has consistently provided in-kind food donations as a part of school nutrition funding.
In 1972, the USDA estimated that food donations constituted 7% of its total school nutrition
budget. Beginning in 1973, Congress took steps to guarantee this average level of additional
support, requiring that the USDA offer extra cash during times of food shortage.lO

In 1977, Congress established higher Federal reimbursement rates for schools located in severe
need areas, such as inner cities. In 1978, Congress established eligibility guidelines whereby
schools qualified for severe need status.lI

In the early 1980's, the new Congress cut back on SBP and school nutrition spending in an
attempt to balance the budget. Under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981,
Congress tightened eligibility for reduced price breakfasts from 195% of the poverty level to
185% of the poverty level, where it stands today. In addition, the federal government lowered the
rates at which it reimbursed schools for meals served. The Reagan administration attempted to
cut some other costs in the school nutrition programs. St. Pierre & Puma (1992) show that
reforms in the early 1980's to reduce fraud in the NSLP were misguided. Many of the NSLP's
eligibility errors can be attributed to income fluctuations.

We can observe from Graph 1 on page 81 that the number of schools in the SBP declined
between 1981 and 1983. We can also observe that the number ofSBP schools grew slowly for
the remainder of the 1980's. We can observe from Graph 2 on page 82 that SBP breakfasts
served per student dropped sharply between 1981 and 1982. Breakfasts per student did not reach
the 1981 level again until 1990.

Within a few years of the budget cuts, Congress revived its efforts to expand the SBP. In the late
1980's Congress voted for higher reimbursement rates and higher nutrition requirements for
school meals. In 1989, Congress authorized the "School Breakfast Start-Up" program. This
program provides grants to individual schools to begin to offer the SBP. The Start-Up program
generated a quick rise in SBP participation. From 1988 to 1993, SBP coverage increased from
38,800 to 55,400 schools. 12 Over the same period, US schools K-12 increased only slightly from
117,000 to 118,000. 13
103 rd Congress. Pages 117-124.
rd
11 I03 Congress. Pages 86-87.
rd
12 103 Congress. Page 88. USDA Data Set.
13 Digest of Education Statistics.
10
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The SBP served 70,000 (57%) out ofa total 123,000 US schools K-12 in 1998.14 In the same
year, 96,000 (78%) schools served lunches. Other school-based child nutrition programs include
Afterschool Snacks (1998), Special Milk (1955), Summer Food Service (1975), Child & Adult
[Day] Care (1978), and Nutrition Education & Training Programs (1966).15 All public and
private schools are eligible to participate in such'programs.16

The SBP is not nearly as widespread as the NSLP is. In 1992, schools served a daily average of
4.92 million breakfasts (0.6 million full price) and 24.6 million lunches (11.7 million full price).
Only 22% of students attending NSLP schools are certified to receive free/reduced price meals.
On the other hand, 42% of students attending SBP schools are certified to receive free/reduced
price meals. I7 In 1995, the NSLP was available to 92% of all grade students and 56% ofthose
students participated on a given day.18 In 1995, the SBP was available to 69% of all grade
students, and 19% participated on a given day.19

Availability and Eligibility

The USDA uses the same reimbursement schedule for the 48 contiguous states and for Guam and
other territories. The USDA assigns Hawaii and Alaska each their own reimbursement schedules
with higher rates. Reimbursement schedules vary according to students' eligibility statuses and
schools' severe need statuses. The USDA reimburses schools more for each free breakfast served
than it does for each reduced-price breakfast served. The USDA reimburses schools more for
each reduced-price breakfast served than it does for each full price breakfast served. Students are
eligible for free breakfasts if their families live at 130% of the national poverty line or below.
Students are eligible for reduced-price breakfasts if their families live at 185% of the poverty line
or below. All other students pay the regular subsidized rate. Schools that fall within severe need
areas receive higher reimbursements in each category. Table 1 on page 83 shows the
reimbursement rates for the continental US for the fiscal year 2000 (FY2000). In addition to cash
assistance, the USDA provides commodity assistance. For FY2000, commodity assistance
14 FRAC. USDA FNS, FACTS. USDA Data Set. Digest of Education Statistics. Total schools figures
represent public schools. NSLP and SBP school figures include private schools that participate.
rd
15 Numbers in parentheses indicate year of inception. USDA FNS Child Nutrition. 103 Congress. Pages
32,97, 106, 125-127,
16 Burghardt and Devaney. Page 179(S).
17 USDA FNS, FACTS.
18 Gleason. Page 214(S).
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averages $0.1475 per meal. As of 1989, the USDA also provides School Breakfast Start-Up
funding to encourage schools to begin to offer the program?O In order to receive reimbursement,
each school sends the number of breakfasts it served to its school district office. Next, the school
district office sends its totals to the State Department of Education (DofEd). The State DofEd
sends its totals to the USDA. The USDA writes checks to the states, the states write checks to the
school districts, and the school districts write checks to the schools. In some cases, schools serve
satellite meals from school district kitchens, so that the district receives the final payment.

Full meal prices vary by school. The USDA sets a nationwide maximum price for reduced-price
meals. For the past five years or more, the maximum reduced price has been 30 cents~l
Individual schools or school districts set the full price to cover remaining program costs. Let us
consider the example of Non-Severe need breakfasts in the continental US this year. If the total
cost of providing a breakfast exceeds $1.09, then USDA reimbursements will not cover program
costs. In this case, schools might charge a high full price to subsidize the provision of free or
reduced-price breakfasts.

In 1980, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) published a stUdy researching reasons for the
SBP's slow expansion rate?2 The authors found that financial burden significantly inhibited
expansion of the program. Many schools lost money by participating in the SBP. The study
described average losses per breakfast in different areas of the country. In 1994, Glantz and
others found that reimbursement rates for school lunches typically exceed program costs.
Schools often use the extra money to subsidize non-reimbursable meals and the SBP, which
typically operates at a loss. Glantz and others and the GAO both cite labor and non-food costs as
major difficulties. Glantz and others examined unreported costs of the program, including
unreported administrative costs. The authors found that in SY1992, the full costs for the SBP
excee.ded the reimbursement rates in 93% of SBP school districts. In 82% of SBP school
districts, the full costs for the SBP exceeded the severe need reimbursement rates. Moreover,
89% of school breakfasts were served at a loss to the institution providing the meal. The authors
estimated a mean total cost of $1.67 and a median total cost of $1.38 per meal.

Gleason. Page 217(S).
USDA FNS. "SY99-SYOO Reimbursement Rates."
21 Telephone interview with Terry Dougherty, Virginia Department of Education, 12/99
22 GAO, "Major Factors ... "
19

20

10

Provisions23

The USDA requires that SBPs conform to a specific meal pattern of two entrees, one fruit,
vegetable, or juice, and one serving of fluid milk. An SBP entree consists of a meat or bread item
or a meat or bread alternative. Meals frequently consist of cereal, juice, and toast. Sometimes
SBP meals include eggs, pancakes, french toast, or sausage. We describe the foods served
through the SBP on page 18 and on Table 4 on page 85. The USDA will only provide
reimbursement for a meal if the student takes at least three of the four items served.

Typically, responsibility falls upon individual schools to plan their own menus. Some school
districts use one kitchen for multiple schools. We call meals from these kitchens satellite meals.
Schools may use a variety of menu-planning methods to meet USDA guidelines and the USDA
publishes a wide range of menu-planning materials. 24

Burghardt and others (1995a) examined meals from a representative sample of US schools
through the School Nutrition Dietary Assessment Study (SNDAS) in 1993:5 SBP meals
generally meet and in some cases exceed the USDA's goal of 14 RDA for both vitamins and
protein. The meals did not meet the USDA's goal of 14 of the RDA for calories. The USDA
encourag~s

food providers to vary portion sizes according to different students' caloric needs.

The USDA does not require SBP meals to include a meat or meat alternative for SBP breakfasts;
both entrees may be bread items or bread alternatives. Consequently, SBPs include a meat or
meat alternate about half the time.

Dietary Guidelines/or Americans (DGA) recommends that Americans eat 30% or less of their
calories from fat and 10% or less of their calories from saturated fat. A 1995 study found that
44% ~fSBP meals meet the total fat goal. Only 4% ofSBP meals meet DGA's saturated fat
goal. 26

LITERATURE REVIEW

23
24

25
26

Burghardt and others (1995a).
USDA FNS, Start the Day. . . , Healthy School . ..
See page 10 for a brief description of the SNDAS.
Burghardt and others.
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The literature review divides into two sections. The first section consists of a discussion of
literature regarding breakfast and the SBP. In the second section, we discuss studies that measure
the economic returns to schooling and to school quality. This second section of the review serves
two purposes. First, the studies support our premise that provisions like the SBP or school
quality can significantly affect students' long-term performance. Second, when we discuss our
empirical results later in the paper, we will compare our own results with results from these
studies.

Review of Breakfast and SBP Literature

This section of the literature review divides into three subsections. First, we review economists'
and nutritionists' work describing supply and demand for school meals and for the SBP. Second,
we explore economists' and nutritionists' studies regarding breakfast and the SBP and how they
affect students' nutrient intake. Third, we examine educators' and medical researchers' studies
describing students' physical, academic, and behavioral improvements that result from breakfast
consumption and SBP participation.

Supply and Demand for School Meals and for the SBP

Philip Gleason (1995) divides SBP demand into two categories. First, he asks whether or not
students eat breakfast at all. Second, he asks whether or not students eat SBP breakfasts. We will
examine the literature regarding SBP supply and demand in four parts. First, we will examine
studies about schools' decisions to participate in the program. Second, we will examine findings
from the literature about breakfast consumption patterns. Third, we will examine school meal
and NSLP demand models. More students participate in the NSLP than do in the SBP, and some
authors have compared the two programs' demand functions. Fourth, we will directly address
,

demand models for the SBP.

School SBP Participation

In 1977, the USDA Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) sampled 625 schools to explore school
SBP participation.

27

The study found that economic need, grade level, enrollment size, and the

presence of snack bars significantly affected school participation. For a school to qualify as
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economically needy, 40% or more of the students qualify to receive free or reduced-price meals.
Economically needy schools were more likely to participate, and schools at lower grade levels
were more likely to participate. Larger schools were also more likely to participate. Table 2 on
page 83 shows the variation in school enrollment by grade level and school SBP availability. We
might expect that larger schools enjoy economies of scale, which would lower per capita costs of
the SBP. SBP availability probably does not affect enrollment size. Schools with snack bars
were more likely to participate in the SBP. The authors suggest that schools could serve the SBP
through the snack bar.

Transportation, kitchen facilities, and required supervisory time did not significantly affect school
participation. Students who did not participate in the SBP were more likely to ride to schools in
cars. Students in the SBP were more likely to ride the bus. Nonetheless, the availability of bus
service did not correlate with SBP availability. We might explain this relationship with the
income disparity between the average SBP participant and the average non-SBP participant.
Imagine that car rides to school are normal goods. Non-SBP participants, who are more affluent,
will ride to school in the car more often than will SBP participants, who are less affluent. Schools
that participated were more likely to have kitchen facilities and cafeterias, but the relationship
was not significant. Supervisory time, defined as the length of time between teachers' arrival and
the start of classes, did not affect school SBP participation.

The Decision to Eat Breakfast

Gleason splits SBP demand into two functions to compensate for contradictory income effects.
Poorer students are more likely to skip breakfast, but poorer students face a lower price for SBP
participation. Gleason (1995) and many other studies indicate that the SBP does not affect the
probability that a student will eat breakfast. We conclude that the SBP exercises no effect on
poor breakfast skippers. Hence, we can distinguish income's positive effect on breakfast
consumption from income's negative effect on SBPeligibility. The two effects apply to different
groups of people.
Age, sex, income, and race play important roles in the decision to eat breakfast. 28 In 1998, SiegaRiz and others examined the demographics of breakfast skipping. The authors analyzed data ·

27
28

USDA FNS, 1978
Gleason. Siega-Riz and others.
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from the Nationwide Food Consumption Survey (NFCS) over 1965, 1977-8, and 1989-91. The
number of people who ate breakfast declined dramatically over the period in question. Black
children and adolescents and Hispanic adolescents skipped breakfast more often than did white
students of the same age and sex. This difference held across all three survey periods. Beginning
in 1977, lower-income students skipped breakfast more often than did higher income students of
the same age, sex, and race. These gaps widened over the periods in question. From 1965 to
1991, the percentage of adolescent girls who skipped breakfast jumped from 15.6% to 35.3%.
The authors did not find significant correlations between the decision to skip breakfast and
mother's employment, family size, or location. The authors also found no relationship between
breakfast skipping and school SBP availability.

Over the same period from 1965-1991, breakfast fat content decreased, and breakfast eaters
consumed more whole grains, fruits, and cold cereals?9 The study indicated that breakfast
skipping increased over the period in question. Fewer people eat breakfast than did before, but
those who eat breakfast eat more healthful breakfasts than they did before. Hence, the increase in
the percentage of healthful breakfasts might simply indicate a decline in breakfasts consumed.
Morgan and others found that children who eat non-sweetened cold cereals are less likely to skip
breakfast than other students are.

Hanes and others (1984) examined data from the National Evaluation of School Nutrition
Programs (NESNP). The NESNP consisted of a nationwide sample of 6,600 sets of students and
parents and 1,900 schools. The surveys suffered very low response rates, and the study used
participation on the day of the interview to proxy for SBP participation. 30 The researchers
determined that students in school districts offering the SBP were more likely to eat breakfast.
They found that 85% of students in SBP school districts ate breakfast, compared with 81.5% of
students in school districts not offering the SBP.

Many economists and biostatisticians have examined the question, and no other researchers have
found a significant relationship between SBP availability and breakfast skipping. Studies include
Devaney and Stuart (1998),31 Siega-Riz and others (1998), Gleason (1995), 32 Nicklas and others
(1993b), Long (1990), and Devaney and Fraker (1989). These authors have tested, through
Siega-Riz and others.
Wellisch and Jordan. Rush, " ... Editor's Technical Notes."
31 Devaney & Stuart. Pages 14-17.
32 Gleason. Page 218(S).
29

30
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various methods, whether or not SBP availability affects the probability that a child will eat
breakfast. The authors use three different definitions for breakfast. Some define breakfast as any
food intake between 5:00 and 10:00 AM. Others define breakfast as any food or beverage33
intake between waking up and 45 minutes after school begins. Still others define breakfast as any
food intake between these times containing a minimum number of calories. Devaney and Stuart
(1998) studied the effect ofSBP availability on breakfast consumption using each of these
definitions.

For example, Gleason used 1992 data from the School Nutrition Dietary Assessment Study
(SNDAS) to analyze national NSLP and SBP demand. The SNDAS included interviews with
food providers and 3350 students and their parents/guardians in 329 schools nationwide.
Researchers considered different students' eating behavior over different one-week periods
between February and May 1992?4 On a given day, 11 % of the students in the study skipped
breakfast. When the researchers limited their sample to students attending SBP schools, they
found that 12% ofthe students skipped breakfast. 35

School Meal and NSLP Demand

Akin and others (1983a) took three days of data from the 1977-1978 NFCS and modeled the
demand for school lunches. The authors found different demand functions depending on each
child's age and free or reduced-price eligibility status. Note that the older students attend
different schools than the younger students do. Middle schools and high schools might allow
students to leave campus. The signs (+) and (-) in Table 3 on page 84 indicate positive or
negative correlations.

Black students were more likely to participate in the NSLP than white students were in all four
groups. Urban students were more likely to participate than rural students were in all cases
except for full price-payers aged 12-18. The authors speculate that urban areas provide these
particular students with more alternative places to eat lunch. The free and reduced-price
equations do not include price as a regressor. Note that income and price are confounded in the
FreelReduced category.

33
34

Not containing caffeine.
Burghardt (1995), " ... Study Design."
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In 1995, Qleason found that 74% of the eligible students in the SNDAS registered for free or
reduced price meals. The main reason that eligible students did not register was that they did not
realize that they were eligible. Free/reduced meal certification (requires application) figured
prominently in the demand function for school lunch. Given certification status, income did not
exert a significant effect on NSLP demand. For full-price payers, Gleason (1995) found a price
elasticity of .25, very comparable to .19 in Akin and others' model (1983a). Hence, demand for
school lunches is very inelastic. Other variables' that affect NSLP demand include access to other
sources for lunch,36 sex (males more likely to participate), age (negative correlation), and race~7
Students also bought fewer lunches when the calories from fat dropped below 32%. The average
school lunch provides 38% of its calories in fat.

McDonald notes the frequency with which eligible households combine benefits from multiple
public assistance programs. Fraker and Moffitt found that many households received both AFDC
and FSP payments. As we see from Akin and others' demand model for school lunches, FSP
participation exerts some influence over school lunch decisions. Many school districts
automatically grant free meal certification status to children ofTANF or FSP recipients. Hence,
families of these students need not report their income when applying for free meals~8 This
provision allows such students quicker and easier access to the programs. We expect that the
demand functions for the SBP and other public assistance programs are mutually dependent.

SBP Demand

Gleason's 1995 study shows that, as with the NSLP, certification status, sex, and age figure
prominently into SBP demand. Students certified to receive free breakfast were particularly
likely to participate. Given that a student will eat breakfast, certification status, full price, age,
sex, race, family income (negative), and urban/rural location determine SBP participation.
Young, male, black, and rural students are more likely to participate than are other students.
Students who are certified to receive free breakfast are considerably more likely to participate
than are students who are not certified. Unlike with NSLP demand, though, students registered to
receive reduced-price breakfasts are no more likely to participate than are full price-payers.
Gleason.
36 Though in-school carts and vending machines do not exercise a significant effect.
37 The grouping of Asians, Native Americans, and Pacific Islanders was statistically more likely to
purchase a school lunch than were other students.
35
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Among full price-payers, price exerts a marginally significant (.05 < P < .10) effect on SBP
participation, with an elasticity of 0.81. Hence, full price SBP demand is inelastic with respect to
prices, but not nearly as much as NSLP demand is. Fat content and other taste considerations did
not figure significantly into the SBP demand equation:

9

Using survey data from the Bogalusa Heart Study, Nicklas and others observed a broad crosssection of children at two different periods in the mid-1980's. The group used parents'
educational level as a proxy for income. The researchers noted that white children of more highly
educated parents were more likely to eat breakfast at home than were white children of less
educated parents. This relationship between home breakfast and parents' education level did not
hold for black students. A majority (59%) of the black students ate breakfast at school, while a
majority (56%) of the white students ate breakfast at home. Males were also more likely to
participate in the SBP than females were.40

Sharon Long found that, while the NSLP only supplemented food expenditures by about 50%, the
SBP totally supplemented food expenditures. Using data from household food expenditure
surveys, Long analyzed families' spending patterns and preference functions for school meals.
Long's model showed that a dollar ofNSLP benefits reduced family food expenditure by about
50 cents. Alternatively, a dollar ofSBP benefits did not reduce family food expenditure. Long's
study indicates that all ofthe money spent on the SBP increases children's food intake. On the
other hand, Long's study also indicates that half of the money spent on the NSLP does not
increase children's food intake. This money simply increases the incomes of families in the
NSLP. Recall that most NSLP participants do not qualify to free or reduced-price lunches.

In 1985, Akin and others showed that the decisive factor for FSP participation was knowledge of
the four food groupS.41 Similarly, food group knowledge and general nutrition education may
factor heavily into SBP demand. Nayga (1997) shows that black, female, higher educated, urban,
and southern household heads exhibit a higher demand for nutritious food. Similarly, heads of
households who are not employed outside of the home exhibit greater nutrition preference than do
other household heads.
Oberlin City School District. MSDE official Carol Fettweis says that the waiver is relatively new in
Maryland.
39 Gleason.
40 Nicklas and others. "Nutrient Contribution of Breakfast. . ." Nicklas and others. "Breakfast
Consumption Affects . . ."
38
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The Effects of Breakfast and the SBP Effects on Students' Nutrient Intake

This subsection divides into two parts. First, we explore what foods students eat for breakfast.
These include home breakfast foods and SBP menus. Second, we review literature describing the
SBP's effects on students' 24-hour nutrient intakes. These studies rely on student and parent
surveys.

Breakfast Foods

In 1998, Devaney and Stuart performed a USDA-funded evaluation of the SBP. The authors
examined whether or not students ate complete breakfasts according to two different standards.
The first standard for a complete breakfast included 10% RDA of five essential vitamins. The
second standard for a complete breakfast included those vitamins plus representation from two of
five major food groups. The authors found that, while SBP availability does not increase the
probability that students eat breakfast, it does increase the probability that lower income students
eat complete breakfasts by both definitions.

Students do not necessarily eat all the food offered in school meals. Senator Tom Harkin notes,
anecdotally, that students waste much less food in the SBP than in the NSLP~2 A school will
only receive federal reimbursement for a school breakfast if the student takes at least 3 of the 4
items served.43 In 1983, Akin and others (1983a) noted that elementary school students were
required to take all five items with lunch. 44 In more recent years, however, the USDA has
allowed schools to provide Offer Versus Serve (OVS) options in high schools to reduce food
waste. More recently, the USDA has required that schools provide OVS options. Through OVS,
students may reject one out of four breakfast items or one out of five lunch items. 45

School breakfasts differ significantly from home breakfasts. Again using survey data from the
Bogalusa Heart Study, Nicklas and others analyzed children's diets depending on where they ate
breakfast. The authors observed a variety of differences in the breakfast food and nutrient

Akin and others. "The Impact of ..."
105 th Congress. Page 3.
43 Oberlin City School District. USDA FNS Pamphlet.
44 Akin and others. "The School Lunch . .. Regression Analysis." Pages 478-479.
45 USDA FNS Pamphlet.
41

42
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compositions between lO-year-olds eating at home and lO-year-olds eating at school. The
authors examined breakfast intake in detail and tracked basic 24-hour nutrient intake variables.
In addition to those foods listed in Table 4 on page 85, home breakfasts were more likely to
contain added sugar, salt, and fat.46 Students who drank milk at home were more likely to drink
whole milk, whereas students who drank milk at school were more likely to drink lowfat
chocolate milk.

Compared with home breakfasts, breakfasts eaten at school contained a higher percentage of the
day's calories, protein, carbohydrates, sodium, and sugars.47 School breakfasts also contained
slightly more cholesterol.48 As mentioned earlier, Morgan and others compared the breakfasteating habits of 5-12-year-olds as a function of non-sweetened cold cereal consumption. The
authors found that non-sweetened cold cereal eaters ate more healthfully at breakfast and over the
entire day than did other breakfast eaters. In 1998, Nicklas and others suggested that the
introduction of cold and hot cereals and lower sodium entrees would improve the nutrient content
of school breakfasts.49

SBP Effects on 24-Hour Nutrient Intake

In 1989, Devaney and Fraker performed the first analysis of the Dietary Impacts of the SBP.
Their study showed that participation in the SBP positively affected calcium and magnesium
intakes and negatively affected cholesterol and iron intakes. SBP did not significantly affect
vitamin A or B6 intake either way. The researchers expressed concern about SBP iron content,
noting the prevalence of anemia in low-income children. The researchers examined 5-1 O-yearolds' and 11-21-year-olds' 24-hour nutrient intakes through survey data. All else equal, young
SBP participants showed significantly lower vitamin A and iron intakes than did young non-SBP
participants. Older SBP participants consumed significantly less vitamin B6 than did older nonSBP participants. SBP participants showed sigriificantly higher calcium intakes and significantly
lower cholesterol intakes for both age groups. Other factors affecting nutrient intake included
sex, female employment outside of the home (negative), education of female head (positive,
particularly for older students), and geography. Males tended to consume more nutrients, as did
younger students from the north:-central or western United States.
46

In the form of butter, margarine, or mayonnaise.

47 School breakfasts contained more lactose and fructose, whereas home breakfasts contained more sucrose.
48

49

Nicklas and others. "Nutrient Contribution of the Breakfast Meal. .." Gleason
Nicklas and others. "Nutrient Contribution of the Breakfast Meal. .."
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In 1993 and again in 1998, Nicklas and others showed that a student's degree of breakfast
consumption affects hislher total daily nutrient intake. Children who skip breakfast compensate
by eating more at lunch and dinner. Nevertheless, these children net fewer calories and nutrients
over the day than do children who eat breakfast. Students who eat school breakfasts consume
more nutrients and calories over the whole day than do students who eat breakfasts at home.
Both groups net higher amounts of nutrients and calories than do students who do not eat
breakfast. 50

Akin and others (1983c) use NFCS data to examine nutrient effects ofNSLP participation for
children of different ages and income levels. The authors show that NSLP participation affects
daily nutrient intake significantly more for younger children than for older children. The authors
also show that NSLP participation affects nutrient intake significantly more for needy children
than for non-needy children. The authors assume that the NSLP's affect on 24-hour nutrient
intake is a simple function of an age dummy and an income dummy. Hence, all children below a
certain age and income experience the same, higher nutrient effect. Similarly, all children above
that cut-off age living above that cut-off income experience the same, somewhat smaller nutrient
effect from the SBP. The authors estimate impact curves for a variety of nutrients for each of
four different age and income groups. At the same time, the authors estimate the cut-off income,
or switching point. At incomes above this point, the NSLP's nutrient effect drops from the higher
constant effect to the lower constant effect. The authors construct impact curves for different
nutrients. For each nutrient, they constructed four nutrient impact curves according to age and
income groups. Their results show that free and reduced-price eligibility levels (130% and 185%
poverty) fall well above the switching points for nutrient impact. The switching-point income
occurred below 100% poverty in all cases, faIling below 60% poverty for three nutrients for older
children. Hence, extremely poor children stand to benefit significantly more from the NSLP than
do less poor children who still qualify for free meals. Moreover, full price-payers stand to benefit
just as much from the NSLP as do free and reduced-price eligible students at higher incomes.

The authors found a positive correlation between NSLP participation and 24-hour nutrient intake
in virtually all categories. Moreover, needier children who ate non-NSLP lunches consumed

50 Nicklas and others. "Nutrient Contribution of Breakfast.. ."
Nicklas and others. "Nutrient Contribution of the Breakfast Meal. . ."
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lower amounts of most nutrients over the day than did needier children who skipped lunch; I We
might conclude that eating home lunches actually hurts students by crowding out more nutritious
consumption at other points in the day. Alternatively, home lunch-eaters might come from
different types of families than do lunch-skippers. Lunch-skippers' families might expect the
children to eat school lunches every day. If so, then lunch-skippers' families might exhibit the
same nutrition preferences as NSLP participants exhibit. These switching-points might not carry
over to the SBP, where we observe less food waste. In the fIrst empirical model in this paper, we
consider short-term effects for all children attending SBP schools. In the second empirical model
in this paper, we consider long-term effects only for those children living below 100% poverty.

The Effects of Breakfast and the SBP on Students' Performance

We divide this subsection into types of effects. Medical researchers and some educators have
studied ways in which breakfast and the SBP affect participants' physical, mental, and behavioral
and academic performance.

Physical and Mental Performance Effects

Studies have demonstrated inconsistent correlations between breakfast and cognition. 52 The
results of these studies differ considerably depending on the age and nutritional status53 of the
child and the type of cognition tested.

Tuttle and others (1954) tested the physical effects of eating cold cereal versus no breakfast on
seven Iowa boys aged 12 to 14. The study turned up mixed results. Dickie and Bender (1982)
did not fInd that eating breakfast on the day of a memory test affected London 12- and 15-yearolds' performance. An Ohio study by Cromer and others (1990) did not fInd that eating an SBP
breakfast affected 12- to 14-year-olds' cognitive test performance. These tests evaluated
memory, attention, and visual and auditory learning. Cromer and others suggest that breakfast
may not affect older children's cognition as much as it affects 9-11-year-olds' cognition. Older
children's metabolism and intellectual demands differ considerably from those of younger
children.

51

52

Akin and others. "The School Lunch . . . Regression Analysis."
Pollitt (1995). Page. 1134.
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Simeon and McGregor (1989) found that the Jamaican school breakfast improved normaI9-1O~
year-olds' performance in math, language, and number memory tests. The breakfast negatively
affected normal students' visual memory and wasted and stuntecf4 students' language and
number memory. Powell and others (1983) found that the Jamaican SBP improved malnourished
adolescents' math performance and did not affect spelling or weight. 55 Lopez and others (1993)
found that breakfast improved normal Chilean

8~-

to ll-year-olds' short-term memory and

problem solving ability. They did not find that breakfast improved normal children's attention.
The authors also did not find that breakfast improved stunted or wasted children's inferior
performance.56

Pollitt and others' (1996) results disagree with the study described above. Pollitt and others also
found that breakfast skipping affected 9- to ll-year-old Peruvian boys differently, depending on
nutritional status. In 1996, Pollitt and others performed a study of fourth and fifth grade (9 to 11
year-old) boys in the Peruvian Andes. The authors classified some children nutritionally at-risk
and others not at-risk. The at-risk children did not perform as well in stimulus discrimination and
memory search tests if they had skipped breakfast that morning. The same difference did not
apply to students who were not at-risk. Students who were not at-risk discriminated visual
stimuli more rapidly when they had missed breakfast. At-risk students did not display the same
effect. Breakfast did not affect students' performance on number discrimination, picture
vocabulary, shape and pattern recognition, or reaction time tests.

The studies above describe the SBP's cognitive effects over a single day. Pollitt and others went
on to test the effect of one month of participation in the Peruvian SBP. Stunted children
performed better on the vocabulary test ifthey had been eating school breakfast that month, but
the effect was not significant. Other tests also showed no significant difference;7 Attendance
rates increased significantly during periods when the students were receiving school breakfast;8
Pollitt (1998) has considered his results along with a number of studies conducted in Jamaica and
in the US. Pollitt has concluded from these studies that a morning fast adversely affects shortterm memory and problem-solving abilities among 9- to 11- year-olds. Pollitt's studies have also
Normal, wasted, and stunted.
Wasting (low weightlheight) indicates recent malnourishment, while stunting (low height/weight)
indicates past malnourishment.
55 Powell and others. Pages 381-386.
56 Pollitt and others (1996). Page (S)22-(S)23 .
57 Number discrimination, picture vocabulary, shape and pattern recognition, and reaction time.
58 Pollitt and others (1996). Page (S)23-(S)25.
53

54
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shown that long-term nutrient deficiencies impair cognitive abilities. He draws particular
attention to the positive effect that SBPs exercise on school attendance:

9

Behavioral and Academic Performance Effects

Remarkably few studies have addressed behavioral and academic performance effects of the
existing US SBP. Tuttle and others anecdotally noted that breakfast improved students' attitudes
and scholastic attainments. Work by Murphy and others confirms some of this anecdotal
evidence. Meyers and others observed performance effects of the introduction of an SBP in a
Massachusetts school district. More recent studies have evaluated the effects of universal
breakfast programs.

Recently, Murphy and others found that hunger plays a large part in low-income American
children's behavior and academic performance. The authors conducted parent and child surveys
and analyzed the responses. The authors found that hungry children were more prone to
hyperactive behavior and impaired mental functions than other children were. Hungry children
were also more likely than other children were to exhibit tardiness and absenteeism. 60

The Lawrence, Massachusetts school district began to offer the SBP halfway through the school
year in January 1987. The households of 7.6% of the eligible students declined free or reducedprice breakfasts. Using these 7.6% as a control, Meyers and others (1989) observed a change in
3rd and 6th graders,61 performance related to SBP participation. Over the semester, participants'
mathematics, language, and reading test scores and attendance improved as compared with nonparticipants. Most significantly, tardiness dropped dramatically among SBP participants. The
researchers speculate that tests improved due to some combination of morning intake and overall
health gains. These improvements might not entirely reflect results of the SBP. The variables
that influenced student participation may have influenced student performance.

Over the 1997-1998 school year, Murphy and others worked to apply their breakfast research
results to the SBP. Murphy and others offered free breakfast to all students in two Baltimore
schools and in one Philadelphia school. The authors surveyed students, parents, and cafeteria
staff. From the onset, Murphy and others found that SBP participants were less likely to report
59

60

Pollitt and others. "Does Breakfast ..."
Murphy and others (1998).
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depression or anxiety than were other students. Moreover, SBP participants earned higher math
62

grades on average than other students did.

Once they implemented the program, Murphy and others observed a number of positive effects.
Over the four-month study period, SBP participation rose from 15% to 27% of the total students.
Universal free breakfast raised students' math grades, increased their atteI}tiveness, and lowered
the incidence of in-school behavioral problems.63 Students' behavior at home and grades in other
subjects did not change significantly. Kleinman64 explained that, while serious starving is
uncommon in the US, the child hunger that does exist seriously affects children's academic
performance.

The Maryland State Department of Education (MSDE) expanded this study over the 1998-1999
school year to include four other schools in four other Maryland counties. Murphy and others
continue to collect data from participating schools. The recent pilot program offers free breakfast
to all students, in the classroom. MSDE officials speculate that universal in-class breakfast
eliminates the stigma cost of the need-based SBP .65

Similarly, the state of Minnesota has provided funds to provide a universal free breakfast program
in 41 schools. Recently, state and local authorities have been funding studies of the program. 66

Bro and others (1994) examined the effects of universal in-class breakfast on high-risk 14- to 18year olds in a Spokane, Washington vocational (welding) high school.67 The study recorded an
increase in on-task behavior on days when breakfast was served. The study recorded no
significant increase in attendance.

Economic Returns to Schooling and to School Quality

In this next section, we discuss some studies relating school to earnings. Many studies have
attempted to explain children's attainments as functions of various inputs, including government
8~ to 9 and 11 ~ to 12 years of age.
McGreevey.
63 Sacks. McGreevey.
64 Another researcher in the study
65 Peiffer and Kerry, MSDE Bulletin.
66 Peiffer and Kerry. Begale.
67 High-risk denotes single parent households, adoption, teen parenthood, or behavior problems.
61

62
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spending on different programs. Haveman and Wolfe (1995) provide a extensive review of such
studies, including a discussion of relevant theory, data, and empirical methods. In this paper, we
empirically evaluate academic effects of the SBP. We would like to extend our results to draw
con~lusions

about the SBP's economic effects. To do so, we use results from human capital

literature. Researchers have also empirically tested the economic benefits of improving school
quality. Using these results, we compare the marginal cost-effectiveness ofthe SBP with the
marginal cost-effectiveness of hiring new teachers.

Returns to Years of Schooling

Card and Krueger (1992a) use US Census data to estimate the returns to schooling for white
males born in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's. The authors estimate average returns by state of
birth. Returns to education ranged from 3.6%/yr. to 7.l%/yr. in the 1920's, and the returns
ranged from 5.8%/yr. to 8.3%/yr. in the 1940's. The authors measure returns to education as
percentage wage increase per year of schooling.

Some studies in recent years have focused on economic returns to schooling holding family
background and genetic endowments constant. Ashenfelter and Krueger (1992) and Ashenfelter
and Rouse (1998) examine samples of twins with differing education levels. In both studies, the
authors collected data from twins attending the Annual Twins Days Festival in Twinsburg, Ohio.
These twins were more highly educated, more highly paid, younger, and more likely to be white
or female than were average Americans. Moreover, the authors speculate that twins attending the
festival exhibit more intra-pair similarity than do average twins. Among twins from the 1991
festival, Ashenfelter and Krueger measured an average 16%/yr. wage increase per year of
schooling. Ashenfelter and Rouse use a larger data set, collected from 1991-1993, involving two
or three cabservations for a number of pairs. Ashenfelter and Rouse obtain a more conservative
estimate of a 9%/yr. wage increase resulting from a year of schooling. The authors estimate
different returns to schooling based on intra-pair averages for educational attainment. They find
that the returns range from 11 %/yr. at 9 years of education to 8%/yr. at 18 years of education.

Ashenfelter and Zimmerman compared father/son pairs and pairs of brothers from the National
Longitudinal Survey (NLS). The authors estimated an average return to schooling between
4.6%/yr. and 8.4%/yr. The researchers' estimates changed depending on the expected
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measurement error. Fathers and younger brothers experienced significantly higher returns to
schooling relative to sons and older brothers, respectively.

School Quality and Earnings

A number of economists have examined whether or not school quality affects children's
educational attainment (in years) or future earnings. These economists' findings and techniques
will help us to understand long-term effects of the SBP. In this section, we review recent
literature that considers the association between school quality and education and earnings. We
also briefly discuss similar studies of the long-term effects of other policies affecting children and
adolescents.

School Quality and Earnings, Holding Education Level Constant

School quality affects both students' educational attainment and their earnings. First, higherquality schools motivate some students to attend school longer. By attending school longer,
students acquire more relevant skills, information, and credentials. Consequently, these students
end up earning more, later in life. As Card and Krueger argue, the correlation between school
quality and earnings may become negative when we hold years of education constant.

The most talented, ambitious students respond to high-quality schools by attending school longer.
The least motivated students will drop out of school, no matter what. Some talented, ambitious
students do not have access to high-quality education. These students may feel stifled in school,
and they may find better ways to spend their time.
Let us compare 10lh grade dropouts from a high quality school with 10th grade dropouts from a
low-quality school. The set of dropouts from high-quality schools will not contain the most
talented and ambitious students. The set of dropouts from low-quality schools may contain some
of the most talented and ambitious students. Consequently, dropouts from high-quality schools
earn less, on average, than do dropouts from low-quality schools. Holding years of education
constant at lower levels of educational attainment, we observe a negative relationship between
school quality and earnings.
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We do not expect to see this negative relationship at the highest levels of educational attainment.
Only the most talented and ambitious students rise to the levels of doctor or lawyer. At the
highest levels of educational attainment, holding years of education constant, school quality does
not exercise a negative ,effect on earnings.

Students at higher-quality schools acquire more relevant skills and information each year than do
students at lower-quality schools. A year of high-quality education better prepares a student for
the workplace than does a year of low-quality education. Hold attainment constant at the highest
levels,where the negative effect does not hold, and school quality exercises a positive effect on
earnings. Among doctors and lawyers, graduates from high-quality elementary and secondary
schools earn more than do graduates from low-quality elementary and secondary schools. Figure
1 on page 85, copied from Card and Krueger (1998), illustrates this positive effect on earnings.

Note the negative relationship between earnings and quality at low levels of education. The high
and low quality education-earnings curves intersect each other at a point above the origin. Card
and Krueger locate this intersection around high school graduation. 68

A selection process occurs around high school graduation, so that the most talented and ambitious
students begin to attend the best colleges. Hence, the college admission process creates a positive
correlation between school quality and student ability independent of the effects of the education
process. Consequently, the actual functions for the curves shown in Figure 1 may not be as
continuous as Figure 1 suggests.

Long-Term Effects of School Quality

Recent studies of school quality returns have focused on teacher-pupil ratios and relative teacher
salaries. Hanushek (1986, 1989) and Hanushek and Taylor (1989) have evaluated the
effectiveness of a number of different school quality measures. First, we review these discussions
of school quality measures. Next, we examine empirical studies of the effects of school quality,
In 1992, David Card and Alan Krueger published two studies observing the effects of school
quality on students' future earnings. In one study, the authors examine the role of school quality
in closing theblacklwhite wage gap for southern-born men born between 1900 and 1949. The
authors pursued this concept further in 1996 by studying racially segregated schools in North and
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South Carolina from 1900-1960. Note that these studies estimate positive earnings effects of
school quality, because they do not hold education level constant.

Eric Hanushek finds a number of problems with traditional measures of school quality. In
particular, he argues that expenditure per pupil does not provide an accurate measure. Ifwe use
expediture per pupil as a proxy for school quality, then we assume that all schools spend money
with equal efficiency. Schools do not all spend money with equal efficiency, and schools
generally allocate money inefficiently. Moreover, if we use expenditure per pupil as a proxy for
school quality, our estimates capture variation in students' family backgrounds. Students at more
affluent schools tend to come from more affluent families. Hanushek argues that much of the
variation in school quality derives from variation in unmeasurable teacher quality. Many of the
school quality variables that Hanushek (1986, 1989) and Hanushek and Taylor (1989) discuss
exhibit reverse causation. When the average test scores decline in a school, the school district
may increase funding to remedy the problem. This reverse causation causes an even greater
measurement problem when we do not know the expected lag structure of the independent
variables. Hanushek and Taylor note that a number of school quality studies use SAT scores as
their dependent variable. Students decide to take the SAT based on their expected performance.
Consequently, variation in SAT scores would not measure differences among marginal testtakers. Moreover, SAT-takers and non-SAT-takers may exhibit different returns to school
quality. These test-taking differences could bias estimates that use SAT scores as a dependent
variable.

Card and Krueger use pupil-teacher ratios to proxy for school quality because they measure
specific services provided to the students. In order to examine the effect of school quality, Card
and Krueger assume each respondent attended school in his state ofbirth.69 They use state
averages"for school quality measures from the Biennial Survey ofEducation (1920-1958) and the
Digest of Education Statistics (1960-present). Rather than examine school quality's effect on
test-scores, Card and Krueger examine long-term performance measures. They use earnings data
from the 1980 Census Public-Use A Samples. These samples link together individuals' responses
for a number of survey questions. Variables include income, educational attainment (in years),
state of birth, and state of residence. The samples include 5% of the US population.
Card and Krueger (1996). Page 38.
During the schooling periods in question, about 90% of students attended school in the states of their
birth. When they account for this as a probability, rates of return to schooling increase by 5-15%, and the
standard deviations rise by a corresponding amount. Card and Krueger (l992a). Pages 28-29.
68

69
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Card and Krueger studied racially segregated schools in North and South Carolina from 19001960. Schools for black students in North Carolina enjoyed better resources than did schools for
black students in South Carolina. Schools for white students in South Carolina enjoyed better
resources than did schools for white students in North Carolina. The school qualities for the
Carolinas converged over the period in question. The authors find from the Carolina data that a
10% reduction in class size led to a 0.4% to 1.1% increase in a child's future earnings. Figures
that the authors examined in previous studies indicated that a 10% increase in school spending led
to a 1-2% increase in students' future earnings.

In another 1992 study (1992a), the two authors consider school quality as it affects the incomes of
white males born between 1920 and 1949?o . Card and Krueger tested relative earnings as a
function of education level, state of residence, urban versus rural residence, and state of birth.
They found that the rate of return to years of schooling varied significantly by state of birth.

The authors then linked each state to a variety of school quality measures, controlling for stateand cohort-effects. These measures included average pupil-teacher ratio, average length of
school term, and average teacher salary (relative to other professions) by state. They found
significant effects for pupil-teacher ratio and for teacher salary?) Controlling for education, the
authors found no significant correlation between parents' incomes or years of education and
•

earnmgs.
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Julian Betts (1995) contrasted his study of the returns to school quality with Card and Krueger
(1992a). Betts used data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) to
examine high school quality's effect on white men's later earnings. With the NLSY79 data, Betts
measured school quality more precisely by isolating the exact schools that respondents attended.

Over three fourths of the schools in the sample contained more than one NLSY79 respondent.
Betts found that respondents' incomes varied significantly according to the high school that each
respondent had attended.73 Betts tested for the income effects oflibrary access, parents'
education levels, and family income, none of which exercised significant effects.
Card and Krueger (l992a).
Card and Krueger (l992a). Page 19.
72 Card and Krueger (l992a). Page 3.
73 P < 0.000005
70
71
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Next, Betts examined income effects of three school quality variables: teacher/pupil ratio, relative
teacher salary, and percentage of teachers with graduate degrees. None of these variables
exercised significant effects on students' earnings. Alternatively, when Betts used statewide
averages for teacher/pupil ratio and for relative teacher salaries, he found that the teacher/pupil
ratio affected income significantly.

Betts suggests a number of possible reasons for this discrepancy. Statewide effects include
effects for grades K-8, while NLSY79 school quality data only measure high school quality.
Earlier school quality may affect earnings more significantly than high school quality does. Betts
also addresses the young age at which respondents reported their incomes. Card and Krueger's
subjects ranged in ages from 30 to 59. Julian Betts's subjects, on the other hand, ranged in ages
from 17 to 32. Card and Krueger's older sample benefits from more highly educated respondents
with more serious jobs. Older respondents are less likely to hold temporary jobs.

Most significantly, Betts does not use pooled data. Because he only uses cross-sectional data,
Betts is unable to control for school-specific effects. Schools vary considerably not only in
resources, but in the types of students that attend. Betts's study finds that rates of return to
education vary significantly according to the type of student who attends the school. The
percentage of disabled students at a school negatively affects high school dropouts' earnings and
positively affects high school graduates' earnings. Betts does not propose an explanation for this
changing relationship. Betts also finds that white males from bigger high schools earn slightly
higher incomes than do white males from smaller high schools. School and student population
differences account for a large part of Betts's variation. These and many other school-specific
variables add to Betts's error terms. Consequently, Betts' error terms may drown out school
quality effects. When he uses state averages for school quality, Betts finds significant effe~ts.
State school quality averages are likely to reflect educational policy, whereas school-specific
measures may simply reflect school-specific demands.

In 1986, Hanushek found no significant correlation between school quality variables and
students' educational attainment. Hanushek used pupil-teacher ratios, teacher salaries, and school
expenditures as quality measures. Hanushek measured educational attainment trends by year for
the US and for the state ofIowa. Hanushek did not measure cross-sectional differences.
Consequently, Hanushek's study may suffer from similar problems as Betts's study. A nUIIlber of
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exogenous variables may influence year-to-year variation in educational attainment. These
variables might include family income, immigration, racial composition, and family structure.

Further School Quality Research and Long-Term Effects Studies

In October 1999, Krueger and Whitmore published a study on Tennessee's Project STAR.
Project STAR randomly assigned 12,000 elementary school students to particularly small classes
for grades K-3. Krueger and Whitmore examined the program's effects on test scores and college
test-taking. The authors account for self-selected test-taking by examining test-taking behavior in
addition to considering test scores. The authors communicated with the Tennessee DotEd and
with Educational Testing Services (ETS) to combine data. Krueger and Whitmore found that
Project STAR significantly improved the probability that students, particularly black students and
lower income students, would take the ACT or SAT. Project STAR also improved students'
performance on the tests by about 0.10 standard deviations. STAR improved black students'
ACT and SAT performance by 0.20 to 0.26 standard deviations.

Economists have used Card and Krueger's methodologies to measure long-term effects of other
policies related to youths and education. Angrist and Krueger (1991) examine compulsory
attendance laws and their effects on long-term student performance. The authors plot educational
attainment and earnings as functions of a student's season of birth, and they find significant
effects. Students who are young for their grades stay in school longer and earn more later in life
due to a minimum dropout age. Angrist and Evans (1999) examine the ways in which abortion
reforms in the 1970's affect female educational attainment. White women did not show sufficient
variation in behavior to measure the effects. Exposure to abortion reforms positively affected
black women's educational attainments. Evans and Dee (1997) examine educational attainment
as a function of minimum drinking age. Dee and Evans find that lower minimum drinking ages
increase the probability that a teenager will drink. Using PUMS data, the authors find that
drinking age does not exercise a significant effect on educational attainment.

STATISTICAL MODEL

In this section, we develop a statistical model to describe short- and long-term effects of the SBP.
We construct this model to formalize our argument that the SBP exercises long-term effects on
students' academic and labor market performance. The equations in the model below correspond
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to the ovals in the flow chart on page 86. We do not model school SBP availability, below, but
recall that we discussed SBP availability in the literature review on page 12. We expect that all
the equations in the statistical model exhibit serial correlation. We omit auto-correlation terms
from Equations (1) through (9) for simplicity.

Student SBP Participation

As mentioned on page 16, certification status, family income, age, sex, race, and urban/rural
location weigh heavily into SBP demand. Given that a student's school participates in the SBP,
we might model SBP demand as follows:

Our universe includes all students K-12 who attend SBP schools. SBP;,I represents the fraction of
mornings in the school year t in which student i eats a school breakfast. YFam;,1 represents the
student's family income that year. Given eligibility status, this effect may be positive or negative,
depending on whether or not school breakfast is a normal good. The free SBP is not a normal
good, because a higher income does not reduce the cost of participation. Price;,1 represents the
price that the pupil faces for school breakfasts. Price;,1 varies from student to student depending
on eligibility status and the school that the student attends. For instance, Price;,1 returns a zero if
student i lives at 130% poverty or below. We expect the price effect to be negative. FElig;,/
returns a one if the student is eligible for free meals and a zero otherwise. RElig;,1 returns a one if
the student is eligible for reduced-price meals and a zero otherwise. We expect that both
eligibility dummies exert positive effects on SBP demand. We expect a4 to exceed as. Students
eligible for free meals face a lower cost for SBP participation than do students eligible for
reduced-price meals. X;,/ represents a vector of control variables. We expect that X;,I would
include the student's age in year t and dummies for the student's sex and race. X;,I would also
include a dummy to represent whether the student lived in an urban or rural location in year t. As
Gleason (1995) notes, younger students are more likely to participate in the SBP than are older
students. Black students are more likely to participate than are non-black students. Male students
are more likely to participate than are female students, and rural students are more likely to
participate than are urban students.
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Gleason (1995) found that price and income affected student participation differently depending
on each student's certification status. To estimate these different effects for income, we can
multiply the eligibility dummies each by YFam;". Note that, for all students eligible for free
meals, Price;" returns a zero. Hence, we would not estimate a free meal price effect. To estimate
the different effects for the price, we would multiply the reduced-price eligibility dummy and the
non-eligibility dummy each by Price;". Hence, we create five different regressors in place of

YFam;" and by Price;". With these specifications, Equation (1) becomes Equation (1 a), below:

(Ia.)

SBP;" = al + a2*(FElig;")*YFam;,, + a3*(RElig;")*YFam;,, + ~*(NElig;")*YFam;,,
+ a5*(RElig;")*Price;,, + ar,*(NElig;")*Price;,, + a7*FElig;" + ag*RElig;" + ~*Xla,;,1+ Ula,;,1

NElig;" represents (1 - FElig;,1)*(1 - RElig;,,), and returns a one if the student is not eligible for free
or reduced-price meals and a zero otherwise. We expect a2 to be negative. Among students
eligible for free meals, as income rises, family income comes closer to the eligibility threshold.
Hence, as a family'S income rises, the family is less likely to know its eligibility status. Hence,
given free meal eligibility, families with higher incomes are less likely to register to receive free
meals. Moreover, because free meals have a price zero, we expect that free meals are inferior
goods. We do not predict signs for a3 or ~, because we do not know whether or not reducedprice or full-price school breakfasts are normal goods. We expect negative signs for both price
effects.

Short-Term Effects
For the purposes of this paper, short-term effects last less than one school year. Short-term
effects include nutrient intake, health, attendance, and cognition improvements resulting from the
SBP. For all the short-term effects we consider below, our universe includes all US students K12. For the short-term effects we consider in our empirical model, our universe includes all US
students K-12 attending SBP schools.

Nutrient Intake

As described in the literature review, researchers have found that the SBP increases a student's
expected intake for many nutrients. We are most interested in nutrient intake adjusted for each
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student's nutrient needs. Hence, we divide nutrient intake by each student's body weight in
pounds.

Ntri,l,lI represents student i's intakes per pound body weight in year t for a vector of nutrients n.
~,i,1

represents a vector of controls by which nutrient intake might vary. These controls might

include the student's age, income, and geographic area in year t as well as the student's age and
sex. We might also include variables to represent parents' education levels and the female
household head's degree of employment outside of the home. As noted in the literature review,
the SBP may exert a negative effect on a student's intake for some nutrients, such as iron. For
most nutrients n, however, we expect that the SBP exerts a positive effect on nutrient intake and
that P2,11 is positive.

Physical and Emotional Health

Murphy (1998) has recently shown that universal free SBPs reduce the number of school nurse
visits and reported emotional and behavioral problems. Hence, we expect that SBP participation
positively influences a student's physical and emotional health.

(4)

EHealthi., = 01 + 02 *Ntri,l,lI + 03 *Healthi" + 04 * X4,i,l + U4,i,1

Healthi,l and EHealthi" represent abstract measures of physical and emotional health, respectively.
Measures might include number of school days divided by the number of nurse visits or the
number of disruptions in class, respectively. We describe emotional health as happiness, attitude
toward school, and motivation. We expect that nutrient intake positively affects both physical
and emotional health, so that Y2 > 0 and 02 > O. We also expect that physical health positively
affects a student's attitude so that 03> O. X 3,i,l and X4,i,1represent control vectors. We might wish
to control for age, sex, race, urbanlrurallocation, family income, and parent's education levels.
In .14,i,,, we might also control for family size and whether or not the child lives with both
biological parents.
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Attendance

We would like to measure the SBP's effect on students' attendance. As shown in Figure 2, this
effect works through a number of different channels. The SBP affects attendance directly by
providing an incentive for children to attend school. The SBP also improves students' nutrient
intake, which, in tum, improves students' physical and emotional health. Less healthy students
are more likely than other students are to miss school because of illness. As a student becomes
better adjusted or more motivated, we expect the student to feign illness less often or to skip
school less often.

Attendi,l represents the proportion of school days in school year t in which student i attends
school. We expect &2,

&3,

and &4 all to be positive.

XS,i,l

represents a vector of controls which

might include sex, age, race, school quality, family income, and parent's education level.

Cognition

A number of studies have shown that children can improve their performance on standardized
tests by eating healthful breakfasts. We expect that nutrition positively affects test performance.
We also expect that better adjusted or more motivated students perform better on tests.

COgi,1 denotes cognitive ability. We might measure Cogi,l with a test score or with a vector of
different test scores. In X 6,i,l, we might control for sex, race, age, urbanlrurallocation, family
income, parents' education levels, and attendance.

Hanushek (1986) notes that researchers have not found convincing evidence linking school
quality and standardized test performance. Few researchers would doubt that cognitive abilities
influence wages. See Heckman (1995) and Murnane and others (1995) for discussions ofthe
importance of cognitive skills in wage determination. 74 Card and Krueger (1992a) find that
school quality significantly affects students' earnings, even if it does not significantly affect

74

Murnane and others (1995). Card and Krueger (1998).
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students' cognitive test performance. As proposed in Figure 2, cognition is not the only channel
through which the SBP can affect students long-term performance or earnings.

Long-Term Effects

We define long-term effects to last one school year or longer. These effects include school
performance and future earnings. The SBP does not directly affect either ofthese long-term
variables . Consequently, we do not include SBP as a regressor in either equation. Nevertheless,
the independent variables in the equations below trace back to SBP participation through a causeand-effect chain.

School Performance

A number of factors affect a student's performance in school. Among the variables that we have
already defined, we expect cognition, emotional health, and attendance to affect school
performance. For whatever reasons, some students perform better than others do in controlled
settings. We expect differences in school performance to reflect these differences. Cognitive
tests also capture some of these differences. Emotional health may affect school performance in
ways that cognition does not capture. For instance, students may test well but act disruptive in
classroom settings. Students who attend school more often expose themselves to the material
more. Hence, we expect attendance to improve school performance.

(7)

Pert,/ = 111 + 112*COgi,/ + 113*EHealth;" + 114*Attend;" + 115*X7,;,/ + U7,;,/

Pert,/ represents an abstract measure of student i's performance in school year t. We could
measure this variable with class rank, grade-point average adjusted for class difficulty, or a vector
of class grades, also adjusted for class difficulty. We expect 112,113, and 114 to be positive. We
might include race, sex, family income, and parents' education levels in x,,;,/.

Educational Attainment

Once we understand students' performance in school, we can begin to model students'
educational attainment (in years). Given school performance, variables like cognition and
attendance become irrelevant. We are not interested in the methods that lead to the student's
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success. We are only interested in the outcome. If a student performs better in school, then that
student can expect to earn a higher grade and to learn more from the next year of schooling. A
student who performs better in school in year t has a greater probability of passing the next grade
in year t +1. Hence, the student who performs better in school faces a smaller risk in attending
another year of school. We also expect that students who are better adjusted or more motivated
stay in school longer.

Attain; represents the (former) student's highest grade completed. We measure this variable in

years of education not including failed grades. We expect 82 and 83 to be positive. X g,;,1 denotes a
vector of control variables which might include sex, race, school quality, family income, and
parents' education levels.

Future Earnings

In the equation below, we address earnings as an indirect function ofthe SBP. Earnings do not
precisely measure the quality of a job or a subject's total welfare. A number of other variables
figure into any given individual's utility function. Although earnings do not correspond precisely
with utility, earnings data do provide us with important information about each (former) student's
welfare. The SBP's earnings effect is particularly interesting because we are evaluating the
effects of a program designed in part to reduce poverty.

¥i,1 denotes (former) student i's future earnings for year t.

Persons with higher education levels

earn higher wages. Similarly, persons who performed better as students are likely to perform
better at their jobs. We expect persons who perform better at work to earn higher wages. For
control variables, we might include sex, race, school quality, and parents' incomes and education
levels.

We have constructed a long chain of relationships. By substitution, this chain traces earnings and
educational attainment back to a multivariate function that includes SBP participation on the
right-hand side. In the empirical model below, we ignore many of the intermediate steps, and we
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regress attendance and educational attainment directly onto SBP participation. Having done so,
we regress employment and wages onto educational attainment to help us to interpret our results.

EMPIRICAL MODEL

We test academic effects of the SBP with two empirical models. Inour first model, we examine
the SBP's statewide aggregate attendance rates. In our second model, we use longitudinal data to
estimate the SBP's effects on educational attainment and earnings. We begin by describing the
available data. Second, we describe the variables and equations that we use, and how they apply
to our hypotheses. Finally, we examine our results and draw conclusions. On pages 101-105, we
include glossaries of variables for the empirical models.

Data

Our models make use of data from the USDA and from the NLSY79 Geocode file. The USDA
has provided us with statewide aggregate data about the SBP. The USDA data set also includes
some statewide aggregate statistics about schools that participate in the SBP, such as attendance
and enrollment. The NLSY79 provides us with a variety of information about a 12,686 of
individuals born between 1957 and 1965. This information includes variables describing these
individuals' demographics, family backgrounds, education levels, and labor market experiences.

In addition the data described below, we also use statewide attendance and enrollment figures
from the NCES' s annual Digest ofEducation Statistics. These data measure enrollment annually
by state from 1962-1997 and attendance annually by state from 1962-1995. When we explore
labor market effects in the second section of Model 2, we use CPI and employment and
population data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In Model2b, we also make
use of labor market and interest rate data from the 1995 Economic Report of the President.

USDA Data

The USDA has provided us with SBP data both annually by state and nationwide by month for a
number of variables. These data cover 32 years, beginning in 1967, when the pilot SBP began.
The data cover 58 states and territories, but we will only consider the 50 states and Washington,
DC. Table 5 on page 87 lists the variables available through the USDA SBP data set.

38

The different SBP variables provide information about different aspects of SBP availability and
participation. If a school receives any federal reimbursement for the SBP, we call that school an
SBP school. According to the provisions of the program, any child attending an SBP school may
participate in the SBP. We use the Enrollment and Average Daily Attendance (ADA) in SBP
schools variables in our first empirical model. These variables tell us how many children had the
opportunity to participate in the SBP in a given state and year.

SBP participants do not necessarily eat school breakfasts every morning. The Participants
variable tells us how many students participated in the SBP at all. Only students enrolled in the
school may participate in the program, so Participants will necessarily be smaller than
Enrollment in SBP schools. As explained on page 9, many schools offer the NSLP but not the
SBP. The next two variables tell us how many students were registered to receive free or
reduced-price meals in the state that year. These students include lunch buyers at non-SBP
schools. For the USDA to approve a student to receive free or reduced-price meals, the student
must both apply and meet income eligibility requirements. If a student attends an SBP school,
then that student faces a greater incentive to register for free or reduced-price meals.
Unfortunately, the USDA does not differentiate between eligible students at SBP schools and
eligible students at non-SBP schools.

The USDA also provides information about the number of school breakfasts served in each state
each year. The Total Breakfasts, Free Breakfasts, and Reduced-Price Breakfasts variables give
the numbers of meals served over the entire year. Average Daily Breakfasts represents the
average number of breakfasts served in the state that year during the peak month nationwide.

Average Indemnity Rate denotes the percentage of schools with more than 40% of the students
living at 130% poverty or below. These schools qualify for special need status, which, as
explained on page 8, grants them higher reimbursement rates per breakfast.

Federal Reimbursement includes Start-Up funding and reimbursements per meal, which depend
on each student's eligibility status and each school's special need status. During the earliest years
of the program, the USDA tracked more specific information about the SBP budget.
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In order to better understand the SBP data, we examine Equations (10), (11), and (12) as
illustrated in Tables 7, 8, and 9:

BPAs" represents total breakfasts served in state s and year t divided by state s' s ADA in year t.
Our sample includes observations from 51 states (including DC) for the years from 1967 to 1995.

Year/ represents a vector of dummies for each year from 1970 to 1995; we omit the years 19671969 for comparison. States represents a vector of 50 dummy variables, one for each state
(including DC); we omit New York for comparison.

In Equation (10), we examine BPA s" as a simple function of a constant and two auto-correlation
terms. In Equation (11), we regress BPA s" on the two auto-correlation terms and 26 year
dummies. In Equation (12), we regress BPAs" on the two auto-correlation terms and 50 state
dummies.

We see from Table 7 that the data are highly serially correlated, and that these two regressors
together with a constant explain 98% of the variance in BPAs,l. When we omit K3*UIO,s,/-2, our
Durbin-Watson statistic drops from 2.04 to 1.37. This change indicates that K3 *UIO,s,l-2 controls
for a significant amount of serial correlation in the model. When we do omit K3 *UIO,s,,-2, K2 drops
from 1.34 to 1.02. We can offer no explanation for K3'S negative value. For some reason, given
serial correlation for one year, an overestimate in year t leads to an underestimate in year t +2.
Nevertheless, this anomaly does not affect our models. The dependent variables in our empirical
models do not exhibit serial correlation past a single year.

In Equation (11), evaluated in Table 8, we include fixed year-effects to capture nationwide annual
changes in the program. We omit the first three year-dummies, so we can consider our yeardummy coefficients in comparison to the first three years of the program. Individually, none of
the year dummies show significant effects. Nevertheless, adding the year-dummies together
reduces the sum of squared residuals by 20%. Using a chi-square test, we can reject the null
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hypothesis that the year-dummy coefficients equal zero with greater than 99% certainty. We can
compare the change in BPAs,t in Table 8 to the change in 100*BreakfastslEnrollment shown in
Graph 2 on page 82. The auto-correlation terms catch much of the upward time trend in BPAs,t.
Once we control for serial correlation, our steady rises become more erratic. Nonetheless, our
coefficients coincide with some of our initial observations about Graph 2. We observe a sharp
drop in BPAi,t in 1982, which coincides with the drop in 100*BreakfastslEnrollment in 1982 in
Graph 2. This drop coincides with cost-cutting efforts during the Reagan administration. We
also observe that the coefficients for the years after 1981 all fall below zero. We observe a
similar relationship in Graph 2. The slope in Graph 2 for 1OO*BreakfastslEnrollment over the
first 15 years of the program generally exceeds the slope for 100*BreakfastslEnrollment over the
1980's.

Equation (12), which we evaluate in Table 9, includes fixed state effects. Through this model, we
understand general state-level differences in SBP participation. We have omitted New York so
that the coefficient for state-dummy s denotes the average difference in BPAs,t between New York
and state s. As with the year-dummies, many of the individual state-dummies do not show
significant effects, but considered together, they pass a chi-square test with greater than 99%
certainty. The states with the most significant and positive effects include Mississippi, Kentucky,
Louisiana, and West Virginia. These four states have ranked in the poorest half of states for the
past 25 years, usually ranking in the poorest quintile. 7s The states with the most significant and
negative effects include Wisconsin, Utah, Alaska, and Wyoming. In 1990, Alaska and Wyoming
ranked as the two least densely populated states, and Utah ranked 1Olh?6 Over the past 25 years,
Alaska has ranked among the 7 states with the highest median 4-person family income, often
ranking number 1. Wisconsin typically ranks in the second quartile along the same distribution.
We expect poorer states to participate more in the program. If more poor children live in a given
state, then more children in that state qualify to receive free or reduced-price meals. Moreover, a
state with more poor children might also contain more schools that qualify for special need status.
Schools that qualify for special need status receive higher reimbursement rates. Hence, these
schools face lower costs for SBP participation. For similar reasons, we might expect affluent
states to participate less in the program. As mentioned on page 7, the SBP was designed in part
to feed children from rural areas. As noted in the literature review on page 12, bigger schools are

7S
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US Census, "Median Income for 4-Person Families, by State."
US Census, "Land Area, Population, and Density for States and Counties: 1990."
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more likely to join the SBP. For th~se reasons, we might expect that schools in non-agricultural
states with lower population density would be less likely to join the program.

NLSY79 Geocode

Our longitudinal data come from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79),
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Our SBP data appear in aggregate
form; yet, we consider long-term performance data for individuals. We know participation rates
by state and by school district. To combine these figures with individual performance data, we
estimate probabilities. We use each individual's state of birth and residence and family
background to estimate the probability that the student participated in the SBP. This probability
is only an estimate. Hence, our regressor represents the number of SBP breakfasts that the
student ate plus some random error of unknown magnitude. This error term will bias our
estimated effect toward zero. School breakfasts might affect long-term performance, but the
random error does not. Our estimated effect represents a weighted average of the breakfast effect
and the random error effect.

The NLSY79 includes responses from a random sample of 12,686 individuals aged 14-21 in
1979. The NLSY79 includes responses from the initial 1979 survey and from seventeen followup surveys from 1980 to 1998.77 Respondents answer questions on a variety of topics including
family background and academic performance. With the Geocode file, we can connect
respondents' answers to those respondents' states and counties of birth and residence. We will
evaluate respondents' education levels as a function of our SBP proxy as well as a number of
control variables.

Composition of Respondents

The NLSY79 respondent population includes a representative sample of about 6,111 members of
the US population born between 1957 and 1965. In addition to this representative sample, the
NLSY79 contains a supplemental sample and a military sample. The supplemental sample
includes 5,295 black, Hispanic, and poor non-black non-Hispanic Americans born between 1957
and 1965. The military sample includes 1,280 military personnel born between 1957 and 1961.
In 1985, NLSY79 dropped the majority of the respondents from the military supplement, leaving
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201 (15.7%) eligible respondents from the original military sample. In 1991, the NLSY79
dropped the poor non-black, non-Hispanic respondents from the supplemental sample, leaving
3,652 (69.0%) eligible respondents from the original supplemental sample.

Of the 9,964 (78.5%) remaining eligible respondents, 8,399 (84.3%) completed the survey in
1998. Ofthose not interviewed in 1998, 731 (7.3%) declined to be interviewed, and 295 (3.0%)
died. Additionally, the NORC marked 725 (7.3%) difficult or impossible to locate, and the
NORC did not interview 136 (1.4%) for reasons not disclosed.

Equations and Variables

In this section, we describe the equations and the variables that we use in our two empirical
models. In our first model, we explore the SBP's effect on attendance in the current year. We
use statewide aggregate figures for both attendance and SBP participation. In our second model,
we explore SBP participation in kindergarten through 2nd grade as it affects individual
respondents' future education levels.

Modell: Attendance in SBP Schools

Our hypothesis suggests that, all else equal, students who participate in the SBP attend school
more often. In order to test the SBP's attendance effect, we use state-level attendance and
enrollment variables from the USDA SBP data set. In order to create our performance variable,

APEs, I> we divide ADA in SBP schools by enrollment in SBP schools. This quotient tells us the
fraction of enrolled students who come to school in a given state on a given day. We multiply
this fraction by 180, the length of a typical school year. By doing so, we can more easily
compare ,our performance variable with our independent SBP variable, BPEs,l.

+ U14,s,t

77

Annual, excluding 1995 and 1997.
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(16)

LAPEs,1 = 1tI + 1t2*LBPEs,1 + 1t3*LPPEs,1 + 1t4*LTPENRs,l1 + 1t5,d*States,d+ 1t6,d*Year"d
+ 1t7*UI6,s,l-1 + UI6,s,1

(17)

LAPEs,1 = PI + P2*LBNPs,1 + P3*LBMPs,1 + P4*LTPENRs,1 + P5,d*States,d+ P6,d*Year d
"
+ P7*U17,s,I-l + UI7,s,l

APES,I represents 180 times ADA in SBP schools divided by enrollment in SBP schools for a
given state and year. BPEs,1 represents the total number of breakfasts served divided by the
enrollment in SBP schools in a given state and year. PPEs,1 represents 180 times the number of
participants in the SBP divided by enrollment in SBP schools in the state. TPENRs,1 represents
the total number of public school teachers K-12 in the state divided by total enrollment in the
state. LBNPs,1 represents the sum of the natural logs of BPEs,1 and PPEs,l. LBMPs,l represents the
difference of the natural logs of BPEs,l and PPEs,l. A variable preceded by "L" denotes the
natural log of that variable. Finally, we consider state dummies, year dummies, and a serial
correlation term. Subscript d indicates vectors of dummies.

Our model covers the years from 1974 to 1995. Our data set is bounded from below by USDA
enrollment figures; the USDA did not begin to track enrollment in SBP schools until 1974. Our
data set is bounded from above by NCES teacher and enrollment figures. The NCES has not
published data for public K-12 teachers and enrollment that are more recent than 1995. We use
pooled least squares estimation for our regressions.

Our dependent variable and our first two independent variables range from 0 to 180. In order to
obtain comparable coefficients, we multiplied ADA and SBP Participants each by 180 over

Enrollment to obtain APEs,1 and PPEs,l. Intuitively, we explain APEs,l as the average number of
days that an enrolled student attends school in a given state and year. We interpret PPEs,1 as the
number of SBP "participant days" divided by enrollment in SBP schools. If every participant ate
a school breakfast every school morning, then BPEs,1 would equal PPEs,l. Figure 3 on page 88
(not to scale) illustrates some of our variables in a Venn-Diagram. Figure 3 describes enrollment,
ADA, and SBP participation for a single day. In our model, we consider the sums of many of
these variables over the entire year.
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The variables, BPEs,/ and PPEs.1tell us infonnation about students' behavior. We would like to
measure the difference in attendance between two otherwise equal students who consume
different numbers of school breakfasts. Students who choose participate in the SBP might
already be different from students who choose not to participate. Our dependent variable may
capture some of these preexisting differences among students. The type of student who
participates in the SBP might already be the type who attends school more often. For instance,
early risers might participate in the SBP and attend school more often than average students do.
Our state dummies should capture much of this effect. If a state contains more motivated
students or more students who wake up early, we expect this difference to persist over time. In
this case, state effects would suffice to capture this variation. Generally, APEs,1increased from
1974 to 1995. Our year effects and serial correlation should capture the differences in children's
behavior over the time period. To the extent that our fixed effects do not capture the differences
in students, our model might bias the coefficients for BPEs,/ and PPEs,/ upward. For instance, we
might observe some systematic correlation between SBP participation and school attendance
policies. In this case, we would capture existing differences among the student population and
we would attribute them to SBP participation. Our model controls for fixed-effects. Our model
assumes that any correlation between APEs,l and either BPES •1or PPEs,/ results from the SBP's
attendance effect.

In Equation (13), the coefficient for BPEs., tells us roughly how many more children show up with
each breakfast served. For instance, we might mUltiply the coefficient by 10, and we would know
how many more children attend if we serve 10 additional breakfasts. Once we include PPEs.1in
our model, in Equation (14), our SBP effect becomes less intuitive. The two variables represent
different changes in the SBP. In Equation (14), when we increase BPEs,l, we increase the number
of breakfasts served while holding the number of participants constant. Any child who eats one
school breakfast in the school year counts as an SBP participant. Not every SBP participant eats
180 school breakfasts in a school year. We see from the data in our empirical model that, on
average, participants from the average state from 1974-1995 consumed 166 breakfasts. When we
increase PPES.I> we increase the number of SBP participants while holding the number of
breakfasts served constant. Including PPEs,1 gives us two SBP variables measuring different
effects. Our first independent variable, BPEs,1> tells us how much the SBP affects existing
participants. If BPEs" increases, existing participants consume more breakfasts, and we see
whether or not attendance increases. If so, we conclude that some SBP participants would not
have come to school if not for the SBP.
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Our second independent variable, PPEs,/, tells us how much the SBP affects new participants. If
we increase PPEs,/ but hold BPEs,/ constant, we measure two simultaneous effects. We increase
the number of participants in the SBP, but we lower the number of meals per participant. Hence,
we take some meals from our existing participants, and we give them to our new participants.
Our statistical models do not predict an effect for PPEs,l holding BPEs,/ constant. Previous studies
have not differentiated between existing participants and new participants. Hence, we cannot
make definite predictions about the coefficient for PPEs,l.

We would like to know the effect of adding participants (increasing PPEs,l) while holding meals
per participant constant. We do not consider meals per participant in our model because the
number is not scaled correctly; it contains participants in the denominator. In order to understand
this relationship better, we consider the log estimations in Equations (15) through (17), where the
coefficients represent elasticities. The numerator for the coefficient represents percentage change
in our dependent variable. The denominator represents percent change in the independent
variable in question.

The coefficient for LBPEs,1 in Equation (15) tells us the elasticity of the total attendance effect of
the SBP. This coefficient gives us the percentage increase in attendance divided by the
percentage increase in breakfasts served. In order to understand the effect of PPEs,/ on APEs,/, we
consider Equation (16). When we increase the number of participant days by 10%, let us increase

BPEs,/ by 10%, as well. We have 10% more participants. If each one eats the average number of
meals per participant, then the number of meals divided by enrollment also increases by 10%. To
consider the combined effect ofthis change, we simply add together the two coefficients for

LBPEs,/ and LPPEs,/. We expect this combined effect to be positive. We can compare the
coefficient for LBPEs,1with the sum of the coefficients for LBPEs,/ and LPPEs,/ in order to
compare these two different aspects of the SBP.

Equation (17) produces the same sum of squared residuals as Equation (16) produces. The two
models are mathematically equivalent, but the coefficients and standard errors provide different
sorts of information in the two models. The sum of the coefficients, P2 and P3, in Equation (17)
should equal1t2 from Equation (16). The difference of the coefficients, P2 and P3, in Equation
(17) should equal1t3 from Equation (16). We observe this conversion in Figure 3, above. By
substitution, 1t2 + 1t3, the coefficient for the combined effect described in the above paragraph, is
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equal to (P2 + P3) + (P2 - P3) = 2*P2' Hence, we can compute the standard error of our combined
effect by halving the standard error for P2.

We expect a positive coefficient for TPENRs,t. All else equal, we expect that a school with more
teachers per student offers more attention and support to its students. If a school offers more
attention and support to its students, we expect that children will show up more often. Teacherpupil ratios proxy for school quality. TPENRs,1might also capture variation in the income or
education level in state s and year t that fixed effects do not capture. We expect that children
from more affluent or more highly educated families attend school more often. These children's
families might place greater emphasis on education. This effect, along with the incentive effect
for school quality, might lead to higher average attendance in schools with more teachers per
pupil.

TPENRs,t ranges from 0.039 to 0.079. When we divide the mean of TEACHERSs,1 by the mean of
ENROLLs.l , we obtain 0,054. Hence, yearly state averages for pupil-teacher ratios range from 13
to 27, with the observations averaging to 18 pupils per teacher. Note that we use a different
denominator for TPENRs,1 than we use for the SBP variables. Our dependent variable and our two
SBP variables contain information about SBP schools by state. We would like to know teacherpupil ratios for the SBP schools in a state in a given year. The USDA does not keep track of that
information. Consequently, we proxy for that variable with teacher-pupil ratios across the entire
state in a given state and year. Hence, TPENRs,1 describes teacher-pupil ratios in SBP schools and
non-SBP schools alike.

Using the statewide aggregate figures for teacher-pupil ratios creates another errors in variables
problem.78 Our teacher-pupil ratio represents the teacher-pupil ratio in state-year s,t plus some
error term. This error biases our coefficient toward zero. Let us consider state-year observation
A, containing some very affluent school districts with very high teacher-pupil ratios. Imagine
too, that the poorer schools in observation A had average levels for teacher-pupil teacher ratios.
Let us also consider state-year observation B with average teacher-pupil ratios across the entire
state. Observation A shows a higher TPENRs,t than does observation B. Nevertheless, when we
consider teacher-pupil ratios among the poorer schools, which are more likely to participate in the
SBP, the two observations are identical. Controlling for other variables, we have no reason to
expect that observation A will have a higher value for APE,·,I' APEs,1 measures attendance in SBP
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schools, where the teacher-pupil ratios are identical for observations A and B. In the situation
described above, TPENRs,/ captured differences in non-SBP schools. When we looked at the SBP
schools to measure the attendance effect, we saw no effect. We might conclude that teacher-pupil
ratios do not affect attendance. In actuality, we have simply used the wrong variable to measure
teacher-pupil ratios in SBP schools.

TPENRs,/ works as a rough estimate of teacher-pupil ratios in SBP schools. In many cases,

differences in TPENRs,/ actually will capture differences in teacher-pupil ratios across SBP
schools in different states. In these cases, TPENRs,/ effectively measures teacher-pupil ratios as
they affect attendance in SBP schools. If teacher-pupil ratios distribute across SBP schools and
non-SBP schools equally, then TPENRs,/ will really capture variation in teacher-pupil ratios in
SBP schools. The more teacher-pupil ratios are distributed equally across SBP schools and nonSBP schools, the better TPENRs,/ works as a proxy. Assuming that teacher-pupil ratios among
SBP schools and non-SBP schools are not distributed perfectly equally, our coefficients are
biased toward zero. Let us consider the difference between teacher-pupil ratios in SBP schools
and those in non-SBP schools. As long as the variance for this difference exceeds zero, we have
biased our coefficient toward zero. This bias holds regardless of the direction of the inequality,
and it even holds if the expected value of this difference is zero. As mentioned earlier, we
encounter a similar problem with our independent SBP variables in our second model, below. In
addition to this bias, we expect that the state- and year-dummies duplicate much of the variation
in TPENRs,/.

In addition to various fonns of BPEs,[' PPEs,[' and TPENRs,t, our model also includes fixed
state- and year- effects and a serial correlation tenn. We omit New York State for comparison.
Our state effects should capture much of the variation due to race, income, average education
level, and other measures of school quality. Because our dummies capture this variation, we
expect that a number ofthese variables would not show significant effects in our fixed-effects
model. Future researchers might choose to test this premise by including such variables.

Model 2: Educational Attainment and High School Graduation

78

We described our first errors-in-variables problem when we described our SBP proxy for Model 2a.
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Our second model divides into two sections. In the first section, we evaluate the SBP's effect on
students' education levels. In the second section, we use these results to form crude estimates of
the SBP's income effect.

Model 2a: The SBP and Educational Attainment

Our hypothesis suggests that, all else equal, students who participate in the SBP complete more
grades of school than non-SBP participants do. Equations (18) and (20) explore the effect of the
SBP on the highest grade that each respondent completed. In Equations (19) and (21), we explore
the effect of the SBP on the probability that a given respondent graduated from high school.

(18)

HGC; = crl*FBPA; + cr2*HGCMOM; + cr3*IPF; + cr4*CTMEDINC; + cr5*BLACK;

+ cr6*MALE; + cr7*RESPONSEAGEj8; + cr8*RESPAGE; + cr9,t*Cohort;,1
+ crlO,s *BState;,s + UI8,;
(19)

HSDUM; = T,I*FBPA; + T,2*HGCMOM; + T,3*INCOME78; + T,4*CTMEDINC;

+ T,5*BLACK; + T,6*MALE; + T,7*RESPONSEAGEj8; + T,8*RESPAGE;
+ T,9,t*Cohort;,1 + T,IO,s *BState;,s + U19,;
(20)

HGC; = ul*BNP; + u2*BMP; + u3*HGCMOM; + u4*IPF;

+ u5*CTMEDINC; + U6* BLACK; + U7* MALE; + U8* RESPONSEAGEj 8;
+ U9* RESPAGE; + ulo/Cohort;,1 + UII,s *BState;,s + U20,;
(21)

HSDUM; = Ij>I *BNP; + 1j>2 *BMP; + 1j>3 *HGCMOM; + 1j>4 *INCOME78;

+ 1j>5*CTMEDINC; + 1j>6*BLACK; + 1j>7*MALE; + Ij>s*RESPONSEAGE_18;

+ 1j>9*RESPAGE; + Ij>IO/Cohort;,1+ Ij>II,s*BState;,s + U21 ,i
HGC; represents the highest grade that the respondent completed. HSDUM; returns a "1" if HGC;
is greater than or equal to 12, and a "0" otherwise. Rather than include a constant term in our
regression, we include dummies for all four cohorts. These four dummies add up to a vector of
716 ones. to obtain the constant term for Equations (19) through (21), we can take a weighted
average of the coefficients for these four dummies. For Equations (18) and (20), we calculate
OLS estimates. For Equations (19) and (21), we use logit models. FBPA; represents Free
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Breakfasts Served divided by ADA in respondent i's state for the years from kindergarten to
second grade. PPA; (not included above) represents total SBP Participants divided by ADA in
respondent i's state for the years from kindergarten to second grade. BNP; represents the sum of

FBPA; divided by its own mean and PPA; divided by its own mean. BMP; represents the
difference of FBPA; divided by its own mean and PPA; divided by its own mean.

HGCMOM; represents the highest grade that respondent i's mother completed. INCOME78;
represents respondent i's family's income in 1978. IPF; represents respondent i's family income
in 1979 divided by respondent i's family size in 1979. CTMEDINC; represents the median family
income in 1969 in the county in which respondent i was born. BLACK; returns a "1" if
respondent i is black and a "0" if respondent i is not black. MALE; returns a "I" if respondent i is
male and a "0" if respondent i is female.

RESPONSEAGE_18; returns a "I" if respondent i was 18 at the most recent response to "What is
the highest grade that you completed?" RESPAGE; represents respondent i's age at hislher most
recent response to the same question.

Our model also includes fixed cohort- and state-effects. The cohort dummies, AGEj 4; through

AGE_17;, correspond to respondents' ages in 1979. Our model only includes 4 age cohorts, so
our 4 cohort-dummies sum to one. Consequently, the weighted average of the cohort-effects
represents the constant term in our regression. In order to compute this term, we would first
multiply each of the cohort-dummies by the number of respondents in the cohort. Next, we add
these products together, and we divide the sum by the total number of respondents. To compute
the significance of a single cohort effect, we would first subtract our constant term from the
cohort effect.

We also include 41 birth-state dummies. Our sample does not include any respondents from
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, or
Wyoming. Furthermore, we omit New York State for the purposes of comparison. State effect s
represents the difference in the average HGC; or HSD UM; between respondents from New York
and respondents from state s. Our data include one response for each individual; hence, our
model does not include a serial correlation term.
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Restrictions Placed on the Sample Population

For the purposes of our study, we reduce our 12,686-person sample with a number of constraints.
The NLSY79 does not include respondents' parents' incomes. The survey does, on the other
hand, include a variable for family income. If the respondent lived in a parental home in the
survey year, then family income includes parents' income. For this reason, we include
respondent's only ifthat respondent replied that he/she lived in a parental home in 1979. The
NLSY79 does not strictly define "parental home." If a respondent lived with one parent, we
expect that the respondent answered that he/she lived in a parental home. If the respondent lived
with a legal guardian who was not a biological parent, then the survey leaves the question open
for interpretation. Among respondents living in parental homes, we selected those whose family
incomes fell below the poverty line in 1978. These restrictions narrowed our sample from 12,686
to 2,465 respondents. We use this poverty restriction to proxy for free meal eligibility 6-17 year
earlier.79 As mentioned on page 20, Akin and others' research suggests that school lunches affect
these children more than they affect non-poor children. This difference mayor may not carry
over to the SBP. If it does, then our estimates only reflect the SBP's effect on poor children.

We place a variety of other restrictions on the sample population. We describe the reasons for
these restrictions in the next few paragraphs. We restrict the sample population to include only
those respondents who lived in their respective states of birth at age 14. We include only those
respondents who were aged 14-17 in 1979. We remove every respondent who did not disclose
the highest grade that he/she completed sometime after the age of 17. We remove respondents
from the sample if they did not answer every question used in our model. We also remove 8
respondents from our model because they did not answer "Did you live with both biological
parents from birth until age 18?" We do not end up using this variable in our final specification
because it did not significantly affect our dependent variables. Nevertheless, we should not
expect that the omission of these 8 respondents biases our estimates in any way. Our final sample
includes 716 respondents.

Education Level

Once we restrict the age-cohorts in our model, this restriction proxies form free meal eligibility 6-11
years earlier.
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For the purposes of our model, we use two dependent variables, HGC; and HSDUM;. HGC;
denotes the highest grade that respondent i completed. HSDUM; returns a one if respondent i
completed 12th grade or higher and a zero if the respondent did not complete 12th grade.

The NLSY79 includes responses to "Highest Grade Completed" for every survey year. As
described on page 43, respondents dropped offfrom the survey for various reasons. We remove
every respondent who did not answer this question after the age of 17. We observe much lower
mean values for HGC; and HSDUM; for this younger subset of the sample population. We expect
that a large proportion of these younger respondents completed more years of schooling shortly
after they answered the survey question.

Our remaining respondents disclosed their education levels anytime between the ages of 18 and
33. Even after eliminating the youngest responses, we find that HGC; and HSDUM; vary
according to the age of the respondent. Hence, we include the two variables,
RESPONSEAGEj 8; and RESPAGE; to control for this variation. RESPONSEAGEj 8; returns a

one if respondent i answered "Highest Grade Completed" at age 18 and a zero otherwise. This
variable controls for 18-year-olds who eventually gradu~ted high school but completed the survey
before they graduated. RESPAGE; denotes the age, between 18 and 36, of respondent i when
he/she reported hislher education level.

RESPAGE; operates largely independently from the age-cohort effect. Imagine two respondents,

both been born in 1963. One drops off from the survey in 1985, while the other stays in the
survey through 1998. RESPAGE; for the first respondent equals 22, while RESPAGE; for the
second respondent equals 35. Birth years for our age-cohorts have a range of three, while
RESPAGE; has a range of 18.

RESPAGE; captures two effects. Older respondents have had more of an opportunity to complete

more years of schooling. Some respondents may have completed high school or the equivalent
some time between the ages of 18 and 33. Others may have attended school at higher or lower
levels of education during those years. We also expect that some of the respondents
misrepresented their education levels as they aged in order to appear more educated. We do not
isolate these two effects. RESPAGE; controls for both effects. We have no reason to think that
either of the RESPAGE; effects can be attributed to the SBP.
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SBP Variables

The NLSY79 survey does not include questions about the SBP. Hence, we estimate the
probability that each respondent participated in the SBP using annual statewide aggregate data.
In order to estimate this probability, we would like to know the state and years in which each
respondent attended school.

We restrict our sample population to include only those respondents who lived in their respective
states of birth at age 14. Consequently, our state-level SBP variable more accurately represents
breakfasts served in the state in which respondent i attended grades K-2. Our SBP data require
that we link every respondent to the state in which the respondent attended school. While that
particular variable is not available, we can proxy for it with each respondent's state of birth.

We restrict our sample population to include only those respondents who were aged 14-17 in
1979. These students were born between 1962 and 1965, and they attended kindergarten between
the years of 1967 and 1970. Respondents took the NLSY79 at different points during t~e year.
We assume that respondents took the survey earlier, rather than later, in the school year. Hence,
if a respondent was aged 16 in 1979, we assume that he/she entered kindergarten 11 years earlier
in 1968. This assumption creates a bias in our estimates. Ifa respondent has an early birthday,
then our model may assume that the respondent began school one year earlier than he/she actually
did. The SBP increased over the period in question, so we assume that these students consumed
fewer breakfasts than they actually did. Angrist and Krueger (1991) show that students with
birthdays later in the school year are less likely to drop out of school. Laws allow these students
to drop out of school early. Hence, this assumption about student ages may bias our estimates
upward. We think students drop out of school because they had fewer breakfasts. In fact, these
students simply have birthdays early in the school year, which predisposes them to dropping out
of school. We do not know the average birthday for respondents in our sample. Hence, we
cannot definitely conclude that this assumption creates an upward bias. Some students have early
birthdays, but some students begin kindergarten at age 6.

The SBP began halfway through the 1967 school year. Hence, the SBP program and the cohort
effects are confounded for all respondents born before 1962. All the respondents in the military
sample were 18 years of age or older in 1979. Hence, by eliminating the older age-cohorts, we
also eliminate all those respondents from the military sample. Recall that we have already
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restricted our sample to include only those students living in a parental home in 1979. If our
sample included respondents aged 18 or older in 1979, then our sample restrictions would select
for specific traits in those respondents. Requiring that these respondents lived in parental homes
in 1979 excludes all respondents who moved away to work or to attend college.

We have restricted the sample population to include only those respondents whose parents lived
at or below the poverty line in 1978. Consequently, we assume that all the respondents in our
population met the income eligibility requirements for free breakfasts.

We do not know precisely whether or not our individual respondents participated in the SBP.
Our models use three variables to describe the SBP in respondent's respective states. Equations
(18) and (19) use FBPA;. FBPA; represents free breakfasts served divided by attendance in
respondent i's state for the years from kindergarten to second grade. First, we add together SBP
statistics from K-2. Second, we add the ADA statistics from K-2. Finally, we divide the sum of
SBP statistics by the sum of ADA statistics to obtain FBPA;. Equation (20) and (21) include
linear transformations of FBPA; and PPA;. PPA; represents the sum of the number of SBP
participants divided by the sum of ADAs for the years from K-2. We use a simple, unweighted
sum for the years K-2 for both FBPA; and PPA;. Future researchers could work to estimate the
appropriate weights for relevant years. The sum, BNP;, and the difference, BMP;, help us to
evaluate the effect of increasing FBPA; and PPA; simultaneously. These transformations are
analogous to LBNPs,1 and LBMPs,,, which help us to understand the effects of a simultaneous
change in Modell.

FBPA; and PPA; provide information about the relative size of the SBP in each respondent's state
during the years from K-2. Our 716 respondents do not constitute a representative sample of the
US, or of their respective states. If they did, then FBPA; would represent the expected number of
free breakfasts that respondent i consumed. Similarly, PPA; would represent the probability that
respondent i participated in the SBP. With our existing sample, FBPA; and PPA; do not pertain as
directly to our respondents. The two variables simply provide information about the relative size
of the SBP for the state and years in which respondent i attended K-2. Our SBP variables do not
measure respondents' degree of SBP participation precisely. Our regressor is a linear function of
our desired regressor (SBP participation) and an error term. Hence, as explained earlier, the
effect that we measure will be biased toward zero.
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All of our respondents lived at or below 100% poverty in 1978. We assume that all of our
respondents qualified for free meals during grades K-2. Hence, we assume that each of our
respondents lived at or below 130% poverty for some specific three-year interval beginning 8-11
years before 1978. Because our respondents are poor, our respondents are more likely than
average to come from poor school districts. As noted in the introduction, the SBP is located
disproportionately in poor school districts. The US government provides stronger incentives for
schools to join the SBP if the schools fall within "special need" areas. We may conclude that our
respondents are more likely to come from SBP schools than average students are.

We also assume that all our respondents qualify to receive free breakfasts. Slightly more than
half of our respondents are black. As noted on page 16, holding income constant, black students
are more likely than non-black students are to participate in the SBP. Our respondents are not
only more likely than average to come from SBP schools. Those of our respondents who
attended SBP schools were more likely to participate in the SBP than were average SBP school
students.

Not all of our respondents have participated in the SBP or have attended SBP schools. Among
those who participated, changes in FBPAi and PPAi may correspond to changes in HGC; and

HSDUM;. Among those who did not participate in the SBP or attend SBP schools, changes in
FBPAi and PPAi do not correspond to changes in HGC; and HSD UM;. We have no reason to
suspect that the SBP affects non-participants. Our coefficients fall below what our coefficients
would be if every respondent participated in the SBP. Our coefficients represent weighted
averages of averages of academic effects of the SBP for those who participated and zeros for
those who did not participate. Our coefficient for FBPAi represents the change in highest grade
completed or HSDUM; divided by the change in the number of breakfasts served. Our coefficient
for FBPA i is a downward-biased estimator of the academic effect to a student of serving a
breakfast to that student.

Again, our set of716 respondents does not constitute a representative sample of students from
their respective birth-states over the period in question. If we did use such a representative
sample, then our coefficient would represent the SBP's academic effect distributed over the entire
population. In this case, we would multiply our coefficient by 180 over PPA i. We scale by 180
so that our denominator becomes Participants/ADA rather than Participant Days/ADA. We
assume that non-participants experience no academic benefits from the SBP. When we multiply
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our coefficient by ADA, we obtain the SBP's total academic effect on everyone. If we knew the
number of participants in our sample, we could then divide this total effect by the number of
persons affected. As we have sufficiently established above, our respondents are more likely to
participate in the SBP than average students are. PPA; over 180 does not accurately measure the
proportion of participants in our sample. Even if it did, we still use a representative sample rather
than the entire SBP population. Hence, our estimates would still suffer from errors-in-variables,
biasing our coefficients toward zero.

We have established that our coefficient for FBPA; falls below the academic effect that results
from giving a student a breakfast. We have also established that our coefficient for FBPA;
probably exceeds the value of that same academic effect distributed over the population. If,
however, our errors-in-variables problem exerts sufficient bias in our model, then our estimate
might fall below the population effect. Nevertheless, 180* FBPA; divided by PPA; probably
overshoots the academic effect that results from giving a student a breakfast. Because we do not
know the number of SBP participants in our sample, we cannot detennine a precise estimate of
the academic effect of one breakfast. Our estimates can, however, provide us with confidence
intervals for upper and lower bounds for this effect. Our upper bound is still biased downward
because of errors in variables. If, at a later date, we choose to relax the restrictions on our sample
population, we could estimate the SBP's academic effect directly. We would still have to
contend with the errors-in-variables problem, though.

When we described Modell, we considered the possibility that students were already different
before they joined the SBP. For instance, we imagined that early risers participated more in the
SBP, and that early risers perfonned better in school. We speculated that our model would catch
these existing differences in students and attribute them to the SBP. In Modell, we used states as
our units of observation, and we used state- and year-effects to control for any such differences.
In Model 2, we use individual respondents as our units of observation, but this bias still does not
concern us. If such differences in people vary by state, then our state-effects control for these
differences. If these differences do not vary by state, then our state-level SBP data do not capture
the individual differences at all. Our state-level data do not attribute individual respondents'
idiosyncrasies to the SBP, because our state-level data only capture state- and year-level trends.

Our first two models describe educational attainment, measured with HGC; or HSDUM;, as
functions of the number of breakfasts served. Equations (20) and (21) attempt to distinguish two
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separate effects of the SBP, much like LBNPs,l and LBMPs" distinguished two separate attendance
effects in Modell. When we model Equations (19) through (21) in log form, we find that our
regressions do not fit the data as well. Many of our variables exert significant effects in linear
form, but not in log form. We conclude that linear variables more accurately model the effects
that we wish to measure. Nevertheless, we include regression results for our log formulations in
Table 15.80

Our log formulations do not yield significant effects. Nevertheless, we would still like to
measure the effects of increasing PPA i while holding FBPA/PADAKT2T; constant. We explain
our reasons for holding breakfasts per participant constant when we describe Modell. When we
consider PPAi and FBPAi as separate variables, the coefficient for PPAi reports the effect of
increasing SBP participation holding breakfasts constant. By increasing PPA i and holding FBPA j
constant, we perform two simultaneous and contradictory operations. We increase the number of
SBP participants, but we lower the average number of meals that each participant receives. We
have essentially taken breakfasts from old participants and given those breakfasts to new
participants. Rather than measure the upshot of these contradictory operations, we wish to give
breakfasts to new participants and to leave old participants alone. When we increase participation
by 10%, we would like to increase breakfasts by 10%. We would like to give our new
participants just as many breakfasts as our old participants have. In doing so, we can see how the
SBP affects new and old participants differently. Because our model uses linear, and not log,
variables we cannot use the same technique as we used in Model l .

We would like a linear variable that captures simultaneous changes in FBPAi and PPAi that are
equal in proportion. This variable does not exist; we cannot capture a geometric operation with
an arithmetic variable. We can create a linear variable that captures simultaneous changes in

FBPA j and PPA j that are equal in proportion at a single point. We model the combined effect of
changes in FBPA; and PPA j with a similar technique as we used in Modell. In Modell, we used
logs, so that the coefficient for LBNPs,l captured simultaneous changes equal in proportion at
every point. In Equations (20) and (21) we use two independent variables, BNPj and BMP j , both
defined as functions of FBPA j and PPA j • As mentioned earlier, BNP j represents the sum of
80 In revising the paper, we discovered that CTMEDINCj and RESPAGEj exert more significant effects on
HGC j when logged. Logging the variables slightly increases our estimated coefficient for FBPA j (from
0.247 to 0.255) and our adjusted R2 (from 0.192 to 0.200). Logging RESPAGEj in the HSDUMj equation
adds some slight significance to the RESPAGEj coefficient and does not affect our other estimates. We use
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FBPA j divided by its own mean and PPA j divided by its own mean. BMPj represents the
difference of FBPA j divided by its own mean and PPA j divided by its own mean. In Equations
(20) and (21), we regress HGCj and HSDUM; on both BNP j and BMPj • These equations are
mathematically equivalent to equations in which we regress HGCj and HSDUM; on both FBPA j
and PPA j • We distribute the coefficients in Equations (20) and (21) over the sum, BNPj , and the
difference, BMPj , and combine terms. Doing so, we can manipulate Equations (20) and (21) to
obtain linear regressions of HGCj and HSDUM; on FBPA j and PPA j •

Figure 5 illustrates the rationale behind our technique. Let FBPA j = Xj, PPA j = Zj, and Yi = HGCj
or HSDUM;. We may add as many other variables to this equation as we like, so long as they do
not contain Xj or Zj. When we take the derivative of both sides with respect to w, tJ.Y/tJ.Wj equals
2*b l . We evaluate Equations (20) and (21) at the mean values for FBPA j and PPA j ,. Hence, 2*b l
in Figure 5 corresponds to 2*uI and 2*$\, respectively.

Heuristically, UI and $1 represent coefficients for the aggregated effected of changing FBPA j and

PPA j simultaneously. On the same level, we can interpret U2 and $2 as coefficients for the effect
of changing the relative sizes of the two variables. Indeed, this interpretation is totally valid for
linear changes in FBPA j and PPA j • Our hypothesis only applies to the mean for both FBPA j and
PPA j , though. Only at that point does a simultaneous change of equal proportion only affect

BNPj and not BMPj •
For Equations (20) and (21), we test the hypothesis that the coefficient for BNPj exceeds zero at
the means for FBPA j and PPA j • We would like to increase participation subject to the constraint
that elasticity of breakfasts to participation equals one. Our hypothesis states that this change
positively affects HGCj and HSDUM; when evaluated at the means for FBPA j and PPA j • The
magnitudes of these effects equal2*uI and 2*$\, respectively.

Control Variables

HGCMOM; denotes the highest grade that respondent i's mother completed. T. Kane (1994)
finds that, among black students, the mother's educational attainment better predicts high school
graduation than does father's attainment. T. Kane also finds that, among black students, the
the HSDU~ specification for our estimates in Model 2b. Hence, this increase does not alter our fmal
estimates.
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mother's attainment level predicts college entry better than the father's attainment does. For
white students, however, the father's attainment level better predicts college entry than does the
mother's attainment. Attainment levels between parents are highly correlated. T. Kane finds that
both parents' attainment levels significantly affect black and white students' attainments, alike. J.
Kane and Spizman (1994) find that the father's education exerts a larger effect than does the
mother's education on the probability that a student enters college.

T. Kane uses a series of eight dummies to represent the different education levels of each parent.
These dummies indicate whether each parent had graduated high scho·ol, attended some college,
completed college, or whether the respondent did not know. In our specification, we only
consider the mother's attainment. Consequently, we only include observations in which the
respondent reported the mother's education level in 1979.81 The mother's attainment level can
serve as a proxy for both parents' education levels. By only using the mother's education, we
need not restrict the model to respondents who know their respective fathers' education levels.
By using HGCMOkL, we may exclude those respondents who grew up without mothers.
However, we do not systematically exclude those respondents who grew up without fathers.

We use different income measurements for the two equations. INCOME78 j represents respondent
i's family's income in 1978. IPF j represents respondent's family income in 1978 divided by

respondent i's family size in 1979. Individually, both variables show significant effects in both
equations, but the variables are highly collinear. IPFj showed a slightly more significant effect in
the HGCj equation, and INCOME78 j showed a slightly more significant effect in the HSDUkL
equation. The two income variables emphasize different aspects of income's effect on
attainment. INCOME78 j tells us more about the parents or the income-providers. This variable
tells us about respondent i's role models just as HGCMOkL does. IPF j , on the other hand, tells us
more about the resources available to the respondent. We expect that child with higher IPF j has
more of an opportunity to attend college. The child has access to more resources. Using this
logic,we might expect that IPFj would factor more significantly when our dependent variable
contains information about college. This is, in fact, the case, and IPFj factors more significantly
into the HGCj equation, while INCOME78 j factors more significantly into the HSDUkL equation.

CTMEDINCj represents the median family income in 1969 in the county in which the respondent

was born. As noted earlier, this county is not necessarily the county in which the respondent
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lived at age 14. Nevertheless, the variable shows a high degree of explanatory power. Given
INCOME78; or IPF;, we can explain CTMEDINC;'s negative coefficient by discussing relative

income changes. Holding family income constant, as median county income decreases, the
child's relative income increases. This relative increase in income could expose the child to more
opportunities.

As Table 6 illustrates, the racial composition of our 716-person sample does not reflect the racial
composition of the US population. As described earlier, the NLSY79 contains a supplemental
sample of black and Hispanic respondents over and above the representative sample of the US.
We have further biased the sample by only including respondents who lived below the poverty
level in 1978. No respondents in our sub-sample are Asian or Pacific American, and no
respondents are both black and Hispanic.

Model 2 does not use pooled data, but our model does include fixed cohort- and birth-stateeffects. The cohort-dummies, AGEj 4; through AGE_17;, correspond to each respondent' s age in
1979. Our respondents vary by state and age-cohort so that these fixed effects become relevant,
even for ordinary least squares and logit estimation. Our birth-state-effects should capture
differences in school quality, income and price levels, demographics, family composition, and
average level of education across states. Once we control for birth-state-effects, teacher-pupil
ratios do not significantly affect HGCj or HSDUM;.
\

Our sample covers a very small range of years. Consequently, we expect the cohort-effects to be
relatively small. Nonetheless, the cohort effects may capture some of the variation in the
economy and in school quality over the time period. For instance, the high school class of 1980
may have faced a different job market than the high school class of 1983 did. These labor market
changes might have affected students' incentives to complete more education. Cohort-effects
might also capture nationwide changes in school expenditures, classroom size, and teacher quality
over the four years.

Other variables that did not contribute significantly to either equation include HISPANIC;,
BOTHPARENTSj , FSIZE;, and MOMAGE;. HISPANIC; returns a one if respondent i is Hispanic

and a zero otherwise. BOTHPARENTSj returns a one if respondent i lived with both parents from

81

The NLSY79 allows respondents to consult with parents in order to answer questions more accurately.
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birth until age 18 and a zero otherwise. FSIZE; represents the size of respondent i's family in
1979, and MOMAGE; represents the age of respondent i's mother in 1987.

Model 2b: The SBP and Labor Market Experience

In the second section of our long-term effects model, we consider employment and earnings as
dependent variables. By estimating the SBP's indirect effects on students' future employment
and earnings prospects, we can determine crude costlbenefit ratios for the SBP.

(22)

EMP;= XI + X2*HSDUM; + 'X3*MALE; + X4,t*WYear;,1 + X6,s*RState;.s + X7,s*BState;.s

(23)

EMP;= 'VI + 'V2*HSDUM;+ 'V3*BLACK; + 'V4*MALE;+ 'Vs*AGE;

+ 'V6*(WREMP/WRPOP;) + U23,;
(24)

!og(WAGE/CPI;) = COl + co2*HSDUM; + co3*HGCMOM; + co4*IPF; + cos*MALE;

+ C06*BLACK; + C07*AGE; + cos,s * RState;.s + C09,s * BState;.s + U24,;
WAGE; represents the wage rate at respondent i's current or most recent job. EMP; returns a "1"
if respondent i had a job in the survey week and a "0" otherwise. The NLSY79 survey contained
these questions for every year from 1979 to 1993. Some respondents skipped one or both ofthe
questions for some ofthe survey years. WAGE; represents respondent i's most recent response to
the wage question. EMP; represents respondent i's answer to the employment question for the
same year as ;' s most recent answer to the wage question. Equation (24) includes only those
respondents for whom EMP; equals one. Different respondents reported their most recent wage
rates in different survey years, from 1981 to 1993. We deflate our wage observations with the
Consumer Price Index. Hence, we measure our wage observations in 1983 dollars per hour.s2
Log denotes natural log. AGE; represents respondent ;'s age for the wage/employment
observation in question. WREMP/WRPOP; represents the employment-population ratio for
respondent ;'s race and age category in hislher state of residence in the survey year.S3 We
estimate Equations (22) and (23) with a logit model, and we estimate Equation (24) using OLS.
Recall from our discussion ofModel2a that we obtain HGCj and HSDUM; from respondent i's
82
83

Approximately. cpr for 1983 equals 99.6, and the average cpr for 1982-1984 equals 100.
Race categories include white, black, and Hispanic. Age categories include 16-19, 20-24, and 25-34.
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most recent report of hislher education level. Respondents reported their education levels as late
as 1998. Hence, a one for HSDUM; might reflect that respondent i completed high school after
i's most recent wage observation. In order to preserve consistency, we do not update HSDUM; to

fit our new model. Hence, we may observe wages or employment statuses for non-high school
graduates and attribute them to high school graduates. If so, then our model contains another
errors-in-variables problem. This problem may bias our HSDUM; coefficients downward.

We expect positive signs for HSDUM; and for MALE; in all three equations. We expect that high
school graduates are more likely to be employed than non-graduates are. Among employed
persons, we expect that high school graduates earn more than non-graduates do. In fact, in
constructing this model, we aim to estimate these positive returns to schooling. All else equal, we
expect that men are more likely to be employed than women are. Women who keep house and
raise children full-time return a zero for EMP;. We also expect that, among employed persons, all
else equal, men earn higher wages than women do. We can attribute this difference to direct
discrimination. We expect negative coefficients for BLACK; in Equations (23) and (24) because
of direct discrimination. We expect positive coefficients for AGE; in Equations (23) and (24),
because older workers have more experience. All else equal, workers with more experience
demand higher wages and are more likely to be employed. Traditionally, wages and employment
vary quadratically with age. At higher age levels, the returns to a year of age decrease as
experience and education loses its relevance. In our sample, however, age ranges from 16 to 3 1.
Our sample does not include any respondents at the higher age levels where wages and
employment decrease with age. AGE? does not show a significant effect on either dependent
variable. We conclude that !og(WAGE/CPI;) and EMP;'s concavity with respect to AGE; is
negligible and can be sufficiently approximated with a linear relationship. Hence, we do not
expect wages or employment to vary quadratically with age for our sample. We expect positive
coefficients for (WREMP/WRPOP;) in Equation (23) and HGCMOM; and IPF; in Equation (24).
Higheremploymentlpopulation ratios for i's demographic group should increase the likelihood
that i is employed. HGCMOM; and IPF; represent opportunities available to i as a child. These
two variables might also capture i' s parents' roles as role models and as standards of
performance. We expect that respondents from more educated or affluent families earn more
than average and are more likely than average to be employed.

In addition to our descriptive regressors, Equation (22) includes state- and year-dummies and
Equation (24) includes state-dummies. The state-dummies in Equations (22) and (24) include
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birth-state-dummies and dummies for the respondent's state of residence in the survey year. We
exclude those dummies that make our models perfectly multicollinear. As before, we do not
include dummies for New York State. Because of this perfect multicollinearity, we know that we
have controlled for the same variation with other variables in our model. We also excluded all
dummies that created sufficient near-multicollinearity as to prohibit estimation of our model.
Similarly, we know that we have controlled for nearly all ofthe same variation with other
variables in our model.

In addition to the variables included in Equation (24), MARRIED; also exerted a significant effect
on WAGE;. MARRIED; returns a "1" if the respondent was married in the survey year and a "0"
otherwise. We exclude MARRIED; because marriage is endogenous. An increase in HSDUM;
raises WAGE;, and this increase in WAGE; might increase the probability that respondent i
marries. Respondent i might be more willing to marry ifhe/she earns a higher wage, and a higher
wage might make respondent i a more attractive spouse. Ifwe control for i's marital status, the
coefficient for HSDUM; does not capture HSDUM;'s total effect. Consequently, we estimate a
reduced-form equation where the effect ofthe exogenous element of MARRIED; simply increases
our error terms.

Further Restrictions Placed on the Sample Population

Before estimating Equations (22) through (24), we impose some restrictions on our sample
population. We impose these restrictions in addition to the restrictions we impose on the
population when estimating Equations (18) through (21).

First, in Equations (22) through (24), we consider only those respondents who were not enrolled
or attending school during the survey year. Attending school imposes a constraint on these
respondents' earning potentials. We would like to know what our respondents earn without that
constraint. Those respondents attending school earned slightly higher wages than the average
respondent did. Hence, excluding them from our model may bias our estimates downward. In
Equations (22) and (24), we exclude those respondents who did not disclose their state of
residence for the survey year. Our employment/population ratio data contain some holes. In
Equation (23), we exclude those respondents for whom employment and population statistics
were not available by race, state, and age group. Some of our remaining respondents never
answered the WAGE; question. Others did not answer the EMP; question in the same year as they
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answered the WAGE; question. We could not include those respondents in our regression
equations. As mentioned earlier, we also restrict Equation (24) to include only those respondents
for whom EMP; equals one. Some of our wage observations may reflect data errors. We omit the
one wage observation of$II,500lhr ($15,000 nominal 1993). We also omit the five wage
observations falling below $llhr in 1983 dollars. Of our 545 remaining respondents, 282 earned
less than $51hr in 1983 dollars. Because we do not include respondents who never disclosed a
wage rate, we may bias our employment estimates upward. Some respondents may not reply
because they never work, or because they work so infrequently that they cannot remember their
last wage rate. If many such respondents exist, then we create an upward bias in our estimates of
the economic return to the SBP and to classroom size reduction. We do not consider some
respondents who are more likely to have zeros for EMP j •

Results

The next few pages explain results from the empirical models described above. We do not
discuss results for our state-dummies or year-dummies. We discuss the chi-square statistic for
adding the variables collectively for each equation. We do not interest ourselves with the
academic or labor market performance.effects of living in one state or another. Including the
information distracts from our statistical analysis. In the pages following our regression results,
we provide information about year- and state-dummies for Equations (14), (19), (22), and (24).

Modell:

Table 10, Column 1 shows regression results from Equation (13) on page 43. Our SBP variable,

BPEs" contributes very significantly (t = 5.40) to our attendance variable, APEs", We obtain a
coefficient of 0.0995. For every 10 breakfasts served, I child shows up to school who would not
have attended otherwise. Column 4 shows us the same SBP effect separated into a positive and a
negative component. When we include both SBP variables, BPEs" and PPEs" in a linear model
(Column 2), we obtain highly significant effects (t = 13.2 and -11.9). This linear model gives us
coefficients of 0.602 and "-0.497 for BPEs" and PPES", respectively. We interpret the coefficient
for BPEs" as we did with Column 1. Holding the number of participants constant, for every 10
breakfasts served, 6.02 children show up to school who would not have attended otherwise.
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As we discussed when we introduced Modell, we cannot easily interpret the coefficient for

PPEs.1 in the linear model. We are more interested in the combined effect of increasing BPEs.1 and
PPEs.1 simultaneously, We can most easily measure this effect using log form, as in Table 10,
and adding the coefficients. As with the linear model, the effects for BPEs.1 and PPEs.1 are highly
significant (t = 12.2 and -10.7, respectively). We turn our attention to LBPEs,t in Column 3.
Holding the number of participants constant, a I 0% increase in the number of breakfasts served
leads to a 1.66% increase in attendance.84 We add the coefficients from LBPES•1 and LPPES•1 and
we obtain a coefficient of 0.0221. In order to calculate the standard error, we add the variances
and add twice the covariance. The coefficients for LBPES•1 and LPPES•1 have a covariance of 1. 70* 10-4. When we add the squares of the standard errors, add twice the covariance, and square
root the sum, we obtain 0.00478. This value represents the standard error for our combined
effect.

In order to verify the standard error and t-statistic for the combined effect, we move to Equation
(17), shown in Column 5. Column 5 shows essentially the same regression as Column 4 does,
with the same sum of squared residuals. We multiply our coefficient for LBNPs., by two to obtain
the effect of a simultaneous change of equal proportion in BPEs,t and PPEs.,' We double the
coefficient 0.01103, and we obtain 0.0221, as with the previous model. We double the standard
errors, and we obtain a standard error of 0.00473, roughly equivalent to our calculated standard
error. The t-statistic for this collective effect is 4.62. Our coefficient indicates that, holding
meals per participant constant, a 10% increase in participation in SBP schools results in a 0.221 %
increase in attendance.

The descriptive statistics from Table 11 provide us with information about various
transformations of enrollment, ADA, and SBP variables. Rather than use means of ratios, we
calculate ratios of means. The mean of breakfasts divided by the mean of participants gives us an
average of 166 breakfasts per participant. If we hold this ratio constant, adding a new participant
involves adding 166 new meals. The mean of ADA divided by the mean of enrollment gives us
0.924. We multiply by 180, and we obtain an average student's yearly attendance of 166. We
divide the average number of participants by average enrollment in SBP schools, and we obtain a
mean participation ratio of 0.221. Given these averages, we can calculate a linear interpretation
of our log formulation evaluated at the mean.

84 Assuming constant enrollment, we may express effects on our dependent variable solely as effects on
attendance.
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Let us imagine an SBP school with 180 students. On a given day, we expect 166 students to
show up. Over the year, our yearly attendance is 166*180 = 29,880 student days. Of these
students, 0.221 *180 = 39.8 participate in the SBP. Imagine that we increase participation by
10%, from 39.8 to 43.8 participants. On average, each of these new participants consumes 166
breakfasts, so we serve 3.98*166 = 661 more breakfasts. This 10% change in participation
increases attendance by 0.0211 * 10% = 0.211 %. By serving 661 breakfasts, we observe
0.00211 *29,880 = 63.0 more instances in which a student shows up to school. Hence, we
conclude that, on average, 100*63/661 = 9.53% of breakfasts given to new participants actually
bring new participants to school. We can contrast this result with our result earlier from
breakfasts given to current SBP participants. On average, more than half (60.2%) of the
breakfasts given to current participants actually bring the participants to school. When we do not
separate the two effects, as in Column 1, we find that adding 10 breakfasts increases attendance
by 0.995. Our combined SBP effect falls much closer to the effect of adding new participants.
hence, most of the difference in SBP participation across states reflects variation in participants
per capita, not breakfasts per participant.

As we discussed when we introduced Modell, our coefficients for TPENRs,1 and for LTPENRs,1
are biased toward zero, because the variables describe teacher-pupil ratios across SBP and nonSBP schools alike. Our most significant effect for this variable appears in Equation (13), shown
in Table 10 in Column 1. From Table 11, we calculate a mean value for TPENRs,1 or 0.0547, or
18.3 students per teacher. Ifwe reduce class size by 1 student, from 18.3 to 17.3, TPENRs,l rises
from 0.0547 to 0.0578, increasing by 0.00316. We multiply this change by our estimated
coefficient of 157.8. We find that a I-person drop in class size increases the average enrolled
student's yearly attendance by 0.499. Next, we multiply by the mean value for SBP enrollment.
We find that a I-person drop in classroom size leads to an average of 160,000 more instances of
students showing up to class in a given state, an average of 889 more students each day. Our next
most significant effect applies to the log variable, LTPENRs,l' We obtain a coefficient that is
significant at the. 10% level, or at the 5% level if we use a I-tailed hypothesis test. We obtain a
coefficient for LTPENRs,1 of 0.0493 . Hence, a 10% increase in TPENRs,1 results in a 0.493%
increase in attendance. At the mean, a 10% increase in TPENRs,1 drops the average class size by
1.7 students, from 18.3 to 16.6. At the mean, this drop leads to a 1461-student rise in ADA,
263,000 more instances of children attending school, and a 0.819 increase inAPEs,l' Our first
model finds a slightly bigger effect, as 0.819 / 0.499 = 1.64 < 1.7. Recall that our coefficients for
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both variables, are biased toward zero. Note also that we have controlled for any fixed state or
year differences in TPENRs".

We run chi-square tests on our state and year dummies to accept or reject them as groups. We
accept the state dummies in all cases with greater than 99.5% significance. We accept the year
dummies for Equations (13) and (14) with 99% significance. The year dummies in the last three
regressions only show 75% significance. When we omit the year dummies from these
regressions, our explanatory variables are still highly significant. None of the coefficients for our
explanatory variables changes by more than 2%.85 In all cases, TPENRs" became highly
significant with the omission of the year-dummies.

Model 2:

As before, we consider Model 2 in two sections. We interpret our results from Model2a in order
to determine the SBP's effect on educational attainment. We interpret our results from Model 2b
in order to estimate the earnings and employment effects of a high school diploma. We combine
the results from our two models to estimate the economic return to a school breakfast. We obtain
a crude costlbenefit ratio for the SBP using these estimates. We also calculate a crude
costlbenefit ratio for classroom size reduction, using Card and Krueger's estimates. We find that,
on the margin, the economic returns to the SBP exceeds by 45% the economic return to hiring
new teachers. Our estimates are crude. Nevertheless, our model provides convincing evidence
that the economic effect of the SBP at least rivals that of reducing classroom size. We do not find
convincing evidence that policymakers can achieve this return by indiscriminately increasing the
number of SBP participants. Our research suggests that selective expansion of the SBP could
capitalize on substantial economic returns.

Model2a:

Table 12 provides descriptive statistics for a number of variables relevant to our model. The free
breakfasts, ADA, and participation variables all represent sums for the years in which the
respondent attended K-2. We represent these variables as FREEBK;, ADAKT2;, and PART;,
respectively. Again, we calculate mean ratios by averaging before we divide. As we compare

85 The coefficient for LBMPM changed by 14% with the omission of the year-dummies, but we only used the
variable as a control to examine LBNP.,,'S coefficient.
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the averages from Table 12, we understand more about the SBP during the period in question.
Recall that each respondent began kindergarten sometime between 1967 and 1970. The SBP
began in January 1967 and expanded very rapidly for the first few years. For the period in
question, the average annual number of breakfasts divided by mean ADA equals 9.64. Again,
our respondents do not constitute a representative sampling of their respective birth-states. If
they did, would have eaten, on average, 9.64 free breakfasts per year from K-2. On average, our
respondents come from state-year combinations in which SBP participants consumed 105
breakfasts per year. Over the years in question, free breakfasts constituted 74.9% of total
breakfasts served in the average state-year observation. On average, our respondents came from
state-year combinations in which students attending SBP schools ate 28.6 breakfasts per year over
the period in question.

Columns 1 and 2 from Table 14 illustrate results from Equations (18) and (19), respectively.
FBPA j shows effects just barely significant at the 5% level (p = 0.0503 and 0.0497, respectively).

Our results fall well within 5% significance for a one-tailed t-test, though. In Column 1, our
dependent variable, HGC j , ranges from 0 to 20, and our right hand SBP variable, FBPA j , ranges
from 0 to 180. We obtain a coefficient of 0.247 for FBPA j • Hence, if the average number of
breakfasts served per year in respondent i's state increased by 4.05 over the period, then the
respondent would complete 1 more grade of school. Recall that the mean for FBPA j equals 9.64.
To scale our number, we multiply 4.05 by the mean of ADAKT2 j , and then we divide by the mean
PART;. We see that, at the mean, increasing FBPA j by 4.05 results in a 442 increase in breakfasts

per participant over the three-year period, or 147 per year.

These figures lead to two interpretations, which serve as upper and lower bounds for our
estimates. These figures represent the lowest and highest numbers of breakfasts required to
increases the average respondent's education level by one grade. Our errors-in-variables problem
biases our coefficient downward. Consequently, we overestimate the number of breakfasts
required to increase the average respondent's education level by one grade. Hence, the error term
in our variables biases our upper and lower bounds upwards. We could assume that every
respondent in our sample is an SBP participant. If so, then we conclude that 147 breakfasts per
year from K-2 leads a respondent to finish one more year of school. Alternatively, we could
conclude that our respondents constitute a representative sampling from their birth-states and agecohorts. If so, then we would conclude that giving a respondent 4.05 breakfasts per year from K2 leads a respondent to fmish one more year of school. These two estimates give us upper and
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lower bounds for the SBP's effect on HGCj • We can expand this interval by one standard
deviation on either side. Our interval for breakfasts per year required for one grade improvement
becomes {2.68, 301}. The maximum number of breakfasts a participant can eat in a year is 180.
Hence, we obtain a wide range of possible values. Ifwe use our upper bound plus one standard
deviation, we predict a relatively small effect. This estimate predicts that no amount of school
breakfasts eaten from K-2 can raise the average respondent's expected education level by one
grade. According to this estimate, the SBP might still influence the education level of
respondents on the border between two expected grade levels. Increasing these students'
expected education levels could have substantial economic effects. In Model 2b, we examine the
economic impact of the SBP's high school graduation effect, described below.

We interpret results from Column 2 with a similar approach. Our average value for HSDUM; is
0.753. Since we are using a logit model, the dependent variable in our regression is the log of an
odds ratio. Hence, our dependent variable for a logit model evaluated at HSDUM;'s mean is log
(0.753/(1-0.753)) = 1.11. Again, our mean value for FBPA j is 9.64. We would like to know the
number of breakfasts required to increase by 5% the likelihood that a given respondent will
graduate from high school. We imagine an average respondent with an average value of
HSDUM; = 0.753. We increase this likelihood by 5%, up to 0.791. The log of our odds ratio

becomes log (0.7911(1-0.791)) = 1.33. We divide (1.33 -1.11) = 0.22 by the coefficient for

FBPA j , and we obtain a change in FBPA j of 0.579. At the mean, in order to increase by 5% the
likelihood that a respondent will graduate high school, we must increase FBPA j by 0.579. As
before, we can convert this number to obtain a maximum number of required breakfasts. We
multiply 0.579 by the mean for ADA and divide by the mean for participation. We find that a 5%
increase in likelihood requires 63.2 breakfasts over K-2, or 21.1 breakfasts per year for three
years. A 5% increase in the probability of graduating from high school requires between 0.579
and 21.1 breakfasts each year for the years K-2. If we tack on one standard deviation to each
side, our interval expands to {0.384, 42.8}. Hence, a 5% increase in the probability of graduating
requires somewhere between 0.384 and 42.8 breakfasts per year from years K-2. In Model 2b,
we explore the economic effects of the SBP using the upper bound of21.1 breakfasts/year.

Next, we consider the academic effect of increasing SBP participants and breakfasts
proportionately. We turn our attention to Equations (20) and (21). The coefficient for BNPj ,
when evaluated at the mean, represents one half the effect of changing FBPA j and PPA j
simultaneously in equal proportions.
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Equations (20) and (21), as described in Columns 3 and 4, show marginally significant effects for

BNP;. In both cases, the variable shows a significant effect at the 10% level and passes a onetailed t-test at the 5% significance level. When we regress either HaC; or HSDUM; on both

FBPA; and PPA;, we show insignificant effects for both explanatory variables. Both independent
variables show significant effects when used separately to explain HaC; or HSDUM;. The two
variables show a correlation of 0.843. This collinearity prevents us from estimating accurate
coefficients when we consider the variables together. Considering BNP; and BMP;, on the other
hand, allows us to separate out the significant effect. BNP; and BMP;, still show some
collinearity, but we obtain a significant effect for BNP;. The variable only shows a significant effect
at the lO%-level. Using a one-tailed test, however, the variable shows significant effects at the 5%-level.

We begin at the mean respective means for FBPA; and PPA;. We increase HGC; by one grade.
Evaluated at the mean, Ll HGC; / Llw = 2*0.156, where 0.156 is the coefficient for BNP; in
Equation (20). The factor, w, acts as the common multiplier for FBPA; and PPA;. Ifwe let Ll

HaC; = 1, then Llw = 3.21. Since we began at the mean, w originally equalled one. In order to
change HaC; by 1, we must increase w by 1. Hence, we multiply FBPA; and PPA; by 4.21. At
the mean, we serve 15,300,000 breakfasts in the state and increase participants by 145,000 in
order to raise the HaC; by 1 grade. Note that PPART; represents a sum of SBP participants in
respondent i's birth-state for the years K-2. Hence, we add 48,300 participants and serve
5,100,000 breakfasts each year for 3 years in order to raise HaC; by 1. Only 48,300 people
experience the effects of those breakfasts, though. At the mean, these 48,300 people represent
0.979% of a given state's population. We assume that new participants occur in our sample as
often as they do in the general population. Hence, we assume that 7.01 of our respondents are
new participants. We give each of them 105.6 new breakfasts per year for K-2, and HGC;
increased by 1. Hence, we increase the number of breakfasts given to our respondents by
7.01 *105.6 = 740 per year from K-2 to increase HaC; by 1. Hence, increasing free breakfasts
specifically among new participants does not affect education level as much as does increasing
breakfasts generally. Our estimated number of breakfasts per year exceeds our estimated upper
bound for the more general HaC; specification.

We perform similar operations with Equation (21) and Column 4. Let us again imagine that we
increase by 5% the likelihood that a given respondent will graduate from high school. This
increase requires a 0.22 increase in our dependent variable, the log of the odds ratio. Now
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suppose that 0.22 /

~w

= 2*0.217, where 0.217 is the coefficient for BNP

j

in Equation (20). We

solve for ~w and we obtain 0.507. Hence, we increase FBPA j and PPA j simultaneously by 50.7%
to increase by 5% the probability that the average respondent graduates high school. Hence, we
serve 2,410,000 breakfasts to 22,900 / 3 = 7,630 participants. These 2,410,000 breakfasts
distribute over three years, and they average 803,000 per year. Let us assume, again, that new
participants occur in our sample as often as they do in the general population. By assumption,
0.00155%, or 1.11, new participants join the SBP from our sample. Consequently, we serve 117
breakfasts annually for 3 years in order to raise by 5% the likelihood of graduating from high
school. Hence, our estimated effect on new participants falls in between our estimated upper and
lower bounds for the more general HSDUM; specification.

In addition to the SBP effects, we note an unexpected effect for one of our dummies. BLACKj
returns a "I" ifthe respondent is black and a "0" if the respondent is not black. BLACKj exercises
a strong positive effect on HSDUM;. The dummy exerts a significant positive effect (t = 1.99)
even when we regress HSDUM; on BLACKj in a bivariate model. Among our sample of poor
NLSY79 respondents, black respondents averaged 12.38 years of schooling, with average
HSDUM; of 0.785. Hispanic respondents averaged 12.50 years of schooling, with average
HSDUM; of 0.703. Non-black non-Hispanic respondents averaged 12.19 years of schooling, with

average HSDUM; of 0.728. We might conclude that black families and communities provide
cultural support and incentives to acquire more education.

Other researchers have also found a black dummy to exert a positive effect on educational
attainment. J. Kane and Spizman (1994) use data from the National Longitudinal Study of the
High School Class of 1972 to examine educational attainment. The authors find that, all else '
equal, being black increases the probability that a student will attend college or graduate school.
The authors suggest three possible explanations. First, affirmative action programs may make it
easier for black people to attend college. In particular, the authors find that, all else equal, black
students are more likely to receive grants or financial awards to attend college. Second, the SAT
may show some cultural bias favoring black students. Third, black students may expect higher
returns to a college education than other students do. Kane and Spizman cite a study by
Meisenheimer (1990) indicating that black students do, in fact, experience higher than average
returns to college. In J. Kane and Spizman's study, black students were less likely to attend for
college when the authors did not control for income and family background variables. Our
findings show that, among poor students, black students are more likely than average to graduate
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from high school. Our results hold even when we do not control for income. We could attribute
this effect to SATs or to college affirmative action programs. Students who face fewer barriers to
entering college also face a greater incentive to graduate from high school. Black students also
might experience (and consequently expect) higher than average returns to a high school
education.

We have tested the chi-square statistics for adding the 41 state dummies or the 4 age dummies
(replacing a constant term). For the HSDUM; regressions, we could reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients for all the state-dummies are zero with 99.5% confidence. For our HGC; equations,
we can reject that same hypothesis with about 85% confidence. For the HGC; equations, we can
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for the age cohorts are equal to zero with 95%
confidence. For the HSDUM; regression, we can reject the same hypothesis with 99%
confidence.

Model2b:

Table 13 shows descriptive statistics for the variables included in Equations (22) through (24).
Note that the number of observations changes from equation to equation. As mentioned when we
outlined the model, we impose different restrictions on the sample populations for Equations (22),
(23), and (24). These changes in the sample population slightly alter the descriptive statistics for
many variables. Equation (23) helps us to understand what sort of variation our state- and yeardummies capture. We do not use Equation (23) to determine our costlbenefit ratio. We do not
concern ourselves with slight sample differences between Equation (22) and Equation (23). We
impose a further restriction on our sample when we estimate Equation (24). We require that
respondents were employed in the survey week. To estimate the total earnings effect of the SBP,
we combine HSDUM;'s effect on EMP; with its effect on !og(WAGE/CPI;). Using this combined
effect, we calculate a crude estimate of the total economic effect of participating in the SBP.

Column 1 shows us results from Equation (22), described earlier. Our mean value for EMP; is
0.829, obtained from Table 13. Again, we use a logit model, so our dependent variable is the log
of an odds ratio. Our dependent variable for a logit model evaluated at EMP;' s mean is
log(0.829/(1-0.829»

= 1.58.

In Equation (22), we obtain a coefficient of 0.697 for HSDUM;. Our

mean value for HSDUM; for our sample is 0.748. Ifwe increase the expected value of HSDUM;
by 5% from 0.748 to 0.785, we increase the log odds ratio for EMP; from 1.58 to 1.58 +

72

0.697*0.0374 = 1.61 . Dividing the inverse log of this number by one plus its inverse log, we
obtain 0.833 as our expected value of EMP j • Hence, at the mean, a 5% increase in the expected
value of HSDUM; leads to a 0.483% increase in the expected value of EMPj • From Model 2a,
serving 63.2 school breakfasts to a child from K-2 will cause such a 5% increase in the expected
value of HSDUM;. Hence 63.2 breakfasts cause a 0.483% increase in the expected value of
EMPj , an increase of 0.014 standard deviations.

Column 3 tells us the wage effect of an increase in the expected value of HSDUM;. Among the
542 employed persons in our sample, the mean value for HSDUM; is 0.788. In Column 3, we
estimate a coefficient of 0.226 for HSDUM;, meaning that being a high school graduate raises
wages by 22.6%. If, instead, we increase HSDUM;'s expected value by 5%, from 0.788 to 0.827,
!og(WAGE/CPlj ) increases by 0.226*0.0394 = 0.00883. Hence, at the mean value for
!og(WAGE/CPlj ), a 5% increase in mean HSDUM; r~ises !og(WAGE/CP1i) from 1.6544 to

1.6632. This increase corresponds to an increase in real wages from 1983 $5.2299/hr to 1983
$5.2763/hr, an increase of 0.014 standard deviations .. Hence, among working persons at the
mean, serving 63.2 school breakfasts from K-2leads to a 1983 $0.0464lhr increase in wages.
When we replace HSDUM; with HGCj in Equation (24) (not shown), we obtain a highly
significant coefficient of 0.0810. Ashenfelter estimates the return to a year schooling for his twin
samples somewhere between 8% and 11 %. We find that, for our sample of respondents, the
return to a year of schooling falls closer to Ashenfelter's lower bound of 8%.

Using a chi-square test for Equation (22), we can reject at the 0.5% significance level the null
hypothesis that the set of dummies exerts no effect for each set of dummies. When we include
all our dummies in Equation (22), very few of our descriptive significantly affect EMPj • Equation
(23) includes descriptive variables rather than dummies. By including the descriptive variables,
we can better understand some of the variation that our dummies capture. Using a chi-square test
for Equation (24), we can reject the null hypothesis at the 97.5% significance level for the stateof-residence-dummies. We can reject the null hypothesis at the 95% significance level for the
birth-state-dummies. We exclude the year dummies from Equation (24) because they exert no
significant effect on log real wages. We do not reject the null hypothesis for inclusion of the
year-dummies in Equation (24) at the 25% significance level (p < 0.75).

The mean value of EMP j for our sample population not enrolled in school is 0.829. The mean
value of EMPj for our total sample population is 0.815. Of our 695 respondents who disclosed
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employment and school enrollment information in the survey year, 33 were attending school. Of
those 33,51.5% were employed during the survey week. Let us imagine that, at the mean, a
respondent from our sample has a job 81.5% of the time. Employed respondents attending school
at the time of the survey earned an average of 1983 $5.501hr. Employed respondents not
attending school earned a mean wage of 1983 $5.23Ihr.

Now, let us give this average respondent63.2 breakfasts over K-2. For our estimates, we ignore
the SBP's effect on respondents' education levels past high school. We assume that, for ages 1864, breakfasts eaten do not affect the percentage of respondents who attend school in a given
year. In doing so, we underestimate the total wage effect of the SBP. Among our respondents
not attending school, expected EMP; rises from 0.829 to 0.833. Holding employment among
respondents in school constant, employment for our tota1695 respondent sample increases from
0.815 to 0.818. Hence, we imagine that our respondent is employed 81.8% ofthe time. Our
respondent's expected wage when working has also risen from 1983 $5.2299Ihr to 1983
$5.27641hr.

We make the simplifying assumption that an increase in the employment rate does not decrease
the mean wage. Hence, we assume that, on average, unemployed persons enter jobs at the mean
wage. In reality, on average, unemployed persons probably enter jobs at lower than the real
wage. This assumption will bias our estimates upwards. In the US, the average workweek has
declined slowly over the past two decades. From Table 13, we see that the average response year
for Equations (22) and (24) averages to about 1992. Hence, we choose the 1992 average of 34.4
hours/week, taken from the 1993 Statistical Abstract of the United States. We assume that, when
working, our respondents work the average number of hours weekly. Respondents from our
sample are unemployed more often than the average American is. Consequently, we expect that
part-time workers will be disproportionately among respondents in our sample. Hence, assuming
the average workweek for our respondents biases our estimates upward. Unlike the average
workweek from our sample, the mean US workweek averages people from many age groups.

Let us assume that a given respondent works 81.5% of the time for each week from age 18
through age 64, a total of2,450 weeks. Hence, this mean respondent works a total of 0.815
34.4 hrs/week

* 2450 weeks = 68,700 hours in hislher career.
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*

At the mean wage, this respondent

earns a total of 1983 $359,000 in hislher career.86 Now, we give the respondent 63.2 breakfasts
as a child. In doing so, we increase the average employment level from 0.815 to 0.818. We also
increase the average wage from 1983 $5.22991hr to 1983 $5.27641hr. At the higher employment
level, our mean respondent works a total of 0.818

* 34.4 hrs/week * 2450 weeks = 68,900 hours

in hislher career. At the higher mean wage, our respondent now earns a total of $364,000 in
hislher career. Hence, giving the mean respondent 63.2 breakfasts over K-2 has increased hislher
expected lifetime earnings by 1983 $5,000. Alternatively, we could give 351 breakfasts to new
SBP participants to achieve the same goal.

Using Glantz and others' estimations, the mean total cost ofa breakfast equals 1992 $1.67 = 1983
$1.19. Hence, an investment of 1983 $1.19

* 63.2 breakfasts = 1983 $75.21 returns a total of

1983 $5000 over the 47 years of the respondent's working life. Hence, a 1983 $1 investment in
the SBP returns a total of 1983 $66 over the respondent's working life. We could invest the
dollar any time between kindergarten and 2nd grade. Assuming constant annual returns, this
investment would return $1.40 every year for 47 years, beginning 11-13 years after the initial
investment. If we restrict our investment to new SBP participants, a 1983 $1 investment in the
SBP returns a total of 1983 $14 over the respondent's working life. Assuming constant annual
returns, this investment returns only 1983 $0.30 per year for 47 years.

We can compare our estimated rate of return to the rate of return on 10-year US Treasury Bills.
Our breakfast calculations use data from 1967-1970, so we imagine purchasing T-Bills beginning
in 1968. Let us imagine that we earn the annualized rate of return on T-Bills from 1968 to 1994.
As we see from Table 21, if we earned the annualized rate of return for T-Bills every year from
1968 to 1994, our initial 1983 $1.00 would be worth 1983 $1.98 at the end of 1994. Let us
imagine that, on the other hand, we invested this 1983 $1.00 in the SBP. If we give the 1983
$1.00 worth of breakfast to a 1st grader in 1968, we begin to earn returns in 1980. Once we earn
the 1983 $1.40 at the end of each year, we reinvest the money in to-year T-Bills. By 1994, our
initial investment has returned 1983 $29.20. Alternatively, if we invest 1983 $1 in new SBP
participants, our initial investment returns 1983 $6.25 by 1994.

Let us consider, alternatively, that we use our money to hire new teachers. Card and Krueger
estimate that a 10% reduction in class size led to a 0.4% to 1.1% increase in a child's future
earnings. Let us use the higher figure and calculate a costlbenefit ratio. The Digest of Education
86

Recall that our sample includes only respondents from disadvantaged backgrounds.
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Statistics provides us with numbers of teachers, ADA, and average teacher salaries by state for
the 1969 school year. Using these data, we calculate the average class size, and the cost per pupil
of reducing a state's average classroom size by 10%. In doing so, we assume that teacher salaries
remain constant while the number of teachers increases. If the demand truly did increase, we
expect that teacher salaries would also increase. Nevertheless, we are interested in marginal
changes, which should not significantly affect prices. For the total US, we calculate this amount
at 1983 $127/yr. For a weighted average of our 716 respondents' states, we calculate this amount
at $120/yr. Let us assume that one year of a small classroom size suffices to create the 1.1 %
earnings increase. Card and Krueger do not calculate teachers' effects on employment. Hence,
we will compare Card and Krueger's estimates with our estimates forwage increases from the
SBP. We ignore employment effects for this comparison. We must assume that classroom size
affects wages in our sample in the same amount as it affects wages in the general population.
Since classroom size.probably affects our respondents more, this assumption biases our estimate
downwards. At the mean, a 1.1 % increase in earnings increases wages from 1983 $5.2299 to
1983 $5.2874 for our sample. Let us make the same assumptions as before about employment
and hours worked. This classroom size reduction raises lifetime earnings from 1983 $359,000 to
1983 $363,000, a 1983 $4000 increase. Considering a 1983 $120 cost per pupil, spending 1983
$1.00 on a new teacher for one pupil raises the pupil's lifetime earnings by 1983 $33 .00~7

Now, let us compare this effect with solely the earnings effect of spending a dollar on the SBP. If
we multiply the higher wage by the lower number of hours, we obtain 1983 $362,000 lifetime
earnings. Hence, considering only earnings, 62.1 breakfasts increase lifetime earnings by $3,000.
Hence, spending $1.00 on the SBP raises the pupil's lifetime earnings by $48.00. Ifwe consider
the economic effect ofadding new SBP participants, 351 breakfasts increase lifetime earnings by
$3,000. Hence, spending $1.00 on new SBP participants raises the pupil's lifetime earnings by
$7.20. Hence, our estimated SBP effect exceeds Card and Krueger's estimated classroom size
reduction effect by 45%. If a 10% classroom size reduction led to a 1.6% wage increase, then the
two rates ofretum would be equal. Dollar for dollar, our lower bound for the SBP's earnings
effect rivals our lower bound for the earnings effect of classroom size reduction. We also observe
that Card and Krueger's estimated classroom size reduction effect exceeds our new SBP
participant effect by nearly 460%. Again, our estimates are crude and downward-biased.
Nevertheless, increasing the SBP appears to show a very strong effect. Our results for increasing

87 Card and Krueger estimate separate school quality effects by state. Future researchers might try the same
technique with the SBP.
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SBP participants are not so conclusive. Recall that we used the greater bound for the return to
classroom size reduction. We simply cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect of
classroom size reduction equals or exceeds the effect of adding new SBP participants .

. There exist alternative means of improving education. Allgrist notes the option of teacher
training programs.88 Researchers know relatively little about the economic effects of this lowcost means for improving school quality. Nevertheless, not knowing the economic returns to
such a policy, the SBP provides an appealing, low-cost means for improving children's
educational experiences.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we explored the SBP and short and long-term academic effects of the program. We
first described the mechanics of the SBP. Next, we reviewed relevant studies about breakfast, the
SBP, schooling, and school quality. Using results and models from the literature, we presented a
formal argument that the SBP influences long-term academic performance. Figure 2 illustrates
that formal argument in a flow diagram. We combined USDA state-level SBP data with a variety
of other data resources to construct empirical models of the SBP's academic effects. Our two
empirical models present strong evidence that the SBP exerts a significant positive effect on both
attendance and educational attainment. Evidence from our second empirical model indicates that
the economic effect of the SBP rivals that of classroom size reduction. Our results suggest that
these returns require increasing the meals given to existing SBP participants, not simply
increasing ~e number of SBP participants.

In our first model, we use pooled, annual, state-level data to examine the SBP's effect on
attendance in participating schools. We find that, on average, for every 10 breakfasts served,
0.995 children attend school who would not have otherwise attended. We find stronger effects
when we hold the number of participants constant. Among those students who already participate
in the SBP, for every 10 breakfasts served, 6.02 children attend school who would not have
otherwise attended. Among new participants, for every 10 breakfasts served, 0.953 children
attend school who would not have attended otherwise.

88
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In the first part of our second model, we examined the SBP's effect on educational attainment.
We use longitudinal data from the NLSY79. We estimate probabilities of SBP participation
using respondents' birth-states and state-level SBP data. Errors in variables prevent us from
estimating specific values. We obtain an upper and lower bound for the number of breakfasts
required to increase the average student's expected attainment by one grade. We similarly bound
the SBP's effect on high school graduation from above and below. In addition, we estimate the
attainment effect of adding new participants to the SBP. We use our estimation of the SBP's high
school graduation effect to determine the economic returns to the SBP. We find that, on average,
consuming 63.2 school breakfasts from K-2 increases a respondent's likelihood of graduating
high school by at least 5%. We obtain this upper bound by assuming that all of the respondents in
our sample participated in the SBP. Consequently, we distribute the SBP's total effect over all
716 respondents in our sample. The real number of SBP participants in our sample probably falls
short of716. Hence, we probably underestimate the SBP's effect on education levels. We also
estimate the educational attainment effect of giving breakfasts to new participants. To increase
by 5% the likelihood that a new SBP participant graduates from high school, the new participated
consumes 351 school breakfasts.

Given these upper bounds, we extend our empirical model to estimate the economic returns to the
SBP. We estimate high school graduation'S effect on future employment and earnings. Making a
series of heroic assumptions, we obtain a crude costibenefit ratio for the SBP. We estimate that,
at the mean, 1983 $1 spent on the SBP returns 1983 $66 in increased employment and earnings
over a respondent's working life. Alternatively, $1 spent on new SBP participants returns 1983
$14 in increased employment and earnings over a respondent's working life. Hence, assuming
constant annual returns, 1983 $1 spent on the SBP in 1968 returns 1983 $1.40 every year from
1980 to 2026. Also assuming constant annual returns, 1983 $1 spent on new participants in 1968
returns $0.30 every year from 1980 to 2026. When find that our estimated returns from the SBP
exceed Card and Krueger's estimated returns to classroom size reduction by 45%. Because our
estimates are crude and rely on a string of heroic assumptions, we do not estimate standard errors
for our estimate. Our evidence merely shows that the economic return to the SBP rivals that of
classroom size reduction. Nevertheless, our upper bound Card and Krueger's estimated effect far
exceeds our downward-biased estimated effect for giving school breakfasts to new participants.
Hence, we do not obtain conclusive evidence about the effect of increasing SBP participation.
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Recently, the SBP has attracted a good deal of media attention and political momentum. As
mentioned earlier, school districts have been experimenting with universal free breakfast
programs for the past few years. Some, like the programs in Minnesota and in Maryland, simply
offer free breakfast to any student who shows up early. ,Others, like more recent pilot program in
Maryland, offer free breakfast in class. Now, Congress has proposed similar programs to be
adopted, nationwide.

Our estimations shed some light on the recent efforts to expand the SBP. Our research provides
substantial evidence to back the claim that the SBP improves children's academic performance.
If these universal free breakfast programs affect poor, marginal SBP participants, then the
economic return to these programs is probably very high. If the investment only increases SBP
participation rates, however, the economic return may not exceed the return to classroom size
reduction. Table 21 illustrates the huge returns to be gained through investing in the SBP.

On the other hand, the universal free breakfast programs may affect more students who do not
qualify for free or reduced-price meals. Our models do not predict the effects of such a program.
Our estimates do suggest, however, that there exist huge economic gains to be realized by
expanding the SBP among existirig participants. To the extent that universal free breakfast
programs reduce the stigma cost for existing participants, these new programs may realize some
of these economic gains. For the most part, these programs have primarily focused on increasing
the numbers of SBP participants. Our research shows that such a program shows very high
returns.

Nevertheless, there exist even larger economic gains to be realized by expanding a different
dimension of the SBP. Existing SBP participants stand to experience tremendous gains from
increasing breakfasts per participant. In 1998, SBP participants consumed an average of 165
meals per year. Hence, we can only increase the average breakfasts per participant by about 15
breakfasts. With 7.2 million participants, at 1983 $1.19/breakfast, we obtain a maximum
investment of 15 breakfasts*7.2 million participants*1983 $1.19 = 1983 $130 million each year.

Not much room exists to expand the SBP among existing participants. Some non-participants
may, however, exhibit the same high returns as existing participants do. These non-participants,
probably poor, might attend SBP schools, or they might attend non-SBP schools. Such non-
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participants may exist. If so, then selective expansion of the SBP offers a means to enjoy the
same return as we observed in our 716-respondent sample.
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Graph 1: US Schools and SBP Schools, 1967-98
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Graph 2: Daily Breakfasts as a Percentage of Total Enrollment, 1967-98
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Table 1: FY2000 Reimbursement Rates for 48 Contiguous
States
Eligibility
Non-Severe Need
Severe Need
Full Price
$0.21
$0.21
Reduced-Price
$0.79
$1.00
Free
$1.09
$1.30

Table 2: Mean Enrollment by Grade and SBP Availability,
1978 US GAO Sample
Grade Level SBP Schools Non-SBP Schools
All Schools
Elementary
505
386
406
Junior High
584
443
459
Jr.-Sr. High
1240
861
890
Consolidated
470
446
449
Special
337
477
455
All Grades
585
494
504
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Table 3: Significant Variables in NSLP Demand by Age and
Eligibility Status
Age Group Free or Reduced Price Eligible Full Price
Ages 6-11 -Food Stamp Program (FSP)
Race, -Price,
Bonus (in $),89 UrbanIRural,
+VitaminA,
+Age
Income, +Household Size,
Race,
-Calories Consumed at Other
Meals
Ages 12-18 +Extent of Female Head's
-Price, Race,
Employment, Race,
UrbanIRural,
+Vitamin A, UrbanlRural,
-Age
-Age, -Income,
-Calories Consumed at Other
Meals

89 At this time, the FSP still restricted food choices, which likely altered participants' behavior
significantly.
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Table 4: Breakfast Composition by Source
Home breakfast

School breakfast

Grits, oatmeal, cold
Biscuits, bread, toast,
rolls
cereal
Milk, cheese
Pancakes
Ham, bologna Bacon, sausage (contains
TVP 9o)
Pop, candy, dessert items
Fruits

Education (in years)
Figure 1: Return to Years of Education by Level
of Educational Quality

90

Texturized vegetable protein (a soy product).
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Figure 2: Proposed Cause and Effect Relationship for the SBP

Nutrient Intake
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Table 5: Variables and Years Available for USDA
SBP Data Set, State-Level Observations
Variable'!
Years Available Years
Annually by
Available
State
Nationwide
by Month
Schools
1967-1998,
1967-1975
Participating in
excluding
1976(TQ)92
the Program
Enrollment in
1974-1998,
1974-1975
SBP Schools
excluding
1976(TQ)
Average Daily
1967-1998,
1967-1975,
Attendance in
excluding
1982-1998
SBP Schools
1976(TQ)
Participants
1967-1998
1967-1975,
1982-1998
Students
1989-1998
None
Approved to
Receive Free
Meals
Students
1989-1998
None
Approved to
Receive
Reduced-Price
Meals
Average Daily
1970-1998
1970-1975,
Breakfasts
1982-1998
Total Breakfasts 1967-1998
1967-1975,
1982-1998
Free Breakfasts
1976-1998
1982-1998
Reduced-Price
1976-1998
1982-1998
Breakfasts
Free &
1967-1975
1967-1975
Reduced-Price
Breakfasts
Free &
1967-1998
1967-1975,
Reduced-Price
1982-1998
Breakfasts as a
Percentage of
Total Breakfasts
Average
1967-1975
1967-1975
Indemnity Rate
Children's
1967-1970
1967-1970
Contribution
1967-1970
Cost of
1967-1970
Purchased Food
Federal CNA
1969-1973
1969-1973
Funds
Federal Section
1969-1973
1969-1973
32 Funds
1967-1998,
Total Federal
1967-1975,
(1976
Reimbursement
1982-1998
Reimbursement
expressed as
breakfasts!
cents)

91 In 1967, the USDA also tracked Other Cash [Income] (besides income from children, states, and the
federal government), Donated Labor, Total Income from States, Total Income, Food Expenditure, Paid
Labor, Donated Labor, Other Cash [Expenditure], Total Expenditure, all in dollars, and Food as a
Percentage of Total
92 The label, 1976TQ, denotes "1976 Transition Quarter." In 1977, the USDA changed the fiscal year from
July-June to October-September. The transition quarter includes ,uly, August, and September 1976. We
have omitted the transition quarter from our analysis.
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Figure 3: Venn Diagram of Enrollment, ADA, and SBP Variables

P2*LBNPs,t + P3*LBMPs,t =
P2*(LBPEs,t + LPPEs,t) + P3*(LBPEs,t-LPPEs,t) =
(P2 + P3)*LBPEs,t+ (P2 - P3)*LPPEs,t =
1t2*LBPEs,t + 1t3*LPPEs,t
Figure 4: Conversion of Coefficients
from Equation (17) to Equation (16).
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Let Yi = b l *(x/x + z/z) + b2 *(x/x - z/z), where x = mean(xi) and z = mean(zi).
Imagine we begin at Xi = x and Zi = z. Holding x and z constant, we increase Xi
and Zi by a factor w. We would like to know the resulting change in our
dependent variable, Yi. We substitute wx and wz for Xi and Zi, add ~Yi to the
left side and solve for ~Y i .

Yi + ~Yi =
Yi + ~Yi =

bl*(wx/x + wzlz)

+ b2 *(wx/x - wz/z).
bl*(w + w) + b2 *(w - w).

Yi + ~Yi =
2w*b l . Take the derivative of Yi with respect to w.
~Y/~w = 2*b l .

Figure 5: Mathematical Rationale Behind BNP; and BMP;, Evaluated at the Mean.

Table 6: Composition of 716-Respondent NLSY79 Sub-Sample
Male
Female
Total
173
362
Black
189
Hispanic
52
59
111
Non-black,
116
127
243
non-Hispanic
Total
352
716
364
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Table 8: USDA Data Year-Dummy
Regression
Table 7: USDA
Data Serial
Correlation
Regression

Variable

BPA"I

Var.

BPA s,I

Table 8: USDA Data State-Dummy Regression
Variable
C

BPAs,1

Var.

BPAs,I

Var.

BPA s,I

37.8***
(1o.n

C

-114

1984

-2.16

AL

LA

OR

ME

PN

MD

RI

14.1
f13.n

MA

SC

-4.12

MI

SD

6.83
(13 .0)

1970

AK

1985

-24.5*
(13.:n

Variable

BPA., I

1971

C

-553
(2170)

1972

1987

AR

US,I_}

1.34***
(0.026)

1973

1988

CA

Us,I_2

-0.343***
(0.0265)

1974

1989

CO

-22.9*
(}3.22)

MN

TN

Adj. R2

1975
0.979

1990

CT

-21.4

MS

TX

MO

UT

0.946*
(1:1.m

MT

VT

14.5

NE

VA

NV

WA

NH

WV

-17.0*
(}3.n

NJ

Wl

-17.4

NM

WY

NC

US,I_}

1986

AZ

-3.34
(130)

(13.0)

(13 .1)

1976

DE

1991

-5.26

0

0'1

(13.0)

Tables 6-8
describe
.
.
regressIOns usmg
annual data from
51 states
(including DC)
over 29 years
(1967-1995)

1977

1992

DC

1978

1993

FL

(13.n

1979

GA

1994

4.72
(13 .0)

1980

1995

HI

-22.1
(Hn

1981

US,I-}

ID

1982

Us,I-2

IL

(13.n

1983

Adj. R2

0.983

IN

-19.8
(13J)

IA

-13.4
(13.m

ND

Us, 1-2

KS

25.9

OH

Adj. R2

Years 1967-1969 omitted for comparison

0.980

(13.n
New York omitted for comparison

Table 10: Regression Results for Modell
Variable

APEs,/

APEs,/

LAPEs,t

LAPEs,t

LAPEs,/

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 4

Column 5

C

145.37***
(4.46)

152.38***
(4.42)

5.0950***
(0.0893)

5.0941 ***
(0.0859)

5.0941 ***
(0.0859)

BPEs,t

0.0995***
(0.0184)

0.6017***
(0.0456)
0.02934***
(0.00496)

0.1659***
(0.0135)

LBPEs,(
-0.497***
(0.0419)

PPEs,/

-0.1438***
(0.0134)

LPPEs,/
LBNPs,t

0.01102***
(0.00239)

LBMPs,/

0.01549***
(0.0133)

TPENR s,/

157.8**
(75.4)

95.2
(71.3)

LTPENRs,t
Us,t-l
Adjusted R2

0.0493

0.0320

(0.0294)

(0.0283)

0.0320
(0.0283)

0.2102***
(0.0281 )

0.2197***
(0.0284)

0.2139***

0.2358***

(0.0282)

(0.0283)

0.2358***
(0.0283)

0.212

0.309

0.211

0.292

0.292

Data cover 51 states (including DC) and 22 years (1974-1995). Coefficients for State and Year Dummies Not Shown

Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Modell, 1121 Observations
Variable
Mean
Median
Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
3.21
E+5
1760 4.95 E+5
1.59 E+5
3.64 E+6
SBPENROLLs,t
2.96E+5 1.46 E+5
1670 4.58 E+5
3.37 E+6
SBPADAs,t
1.18 E+7 5.58 E+6
57600 1.75 E+7
1.36 E+8
BKTOTs,t
71100
33600
257 1.04 E+5
7.53 E+5
PARTICIPs,t
44800
4090
44800
32900
2.40 E+5
TEA CHERSs,t
.
5.50E+5
7.56
E+5
E+6
8.14
E+5
5.20
69100
ADAs,t
8.19 E+5 5.89 E+5
5.54 E+6
79800 8.65 E+5
ENROLLs,t
166
167
178
102
6.49
APEs,t
4.78
166
166
188
147
YATPENs"
35.9
15.4
38.8
131
4.38
BPEs,t
0.397
4.87
3.58
3.58
1.48
LBPEs,t
41.9
37.4
144
4.14
17.6
PPEs,t
0.413
4.97
3.65
3.62
1.42
LPPEs,t
7.24
7.20
9.84
2.90
0.803
LBNPs,t
-0.0699
0.460
-0.931
-0.0725
. 0.109
LBMPs,t
0.0566
0.0787
0.0563
0.0395
0.00772
TPENRs,t
-2.54
-2.88
-2.88
-3.23
0.138
LTPENRs,t
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model2a, 716 Observations
Variable
Mean
Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
Median
12.3
20
HGC;
12
7
1.97
HSDUM;
0.753
1
1
0
0.432
FREEBK;
4.75 E+6 2.81 E+6
2.90 E+7
44313 5.62 E+6
ADAKT2;
4.93 E+6 3.35 E+6
1.41 E+7
218 E+5 3.64 E+6
PART;
45200
1000
45800
27100
2.60 E+5
SBPADAKT2;
1.65 E+5 1.13 E+5
8.68 E+5
2860 1.64 E+5
FBPA;
1.16
0.792
9.05
0.00663
1.25
BPM;
1.00
0.682
7.79
0.00570
1.08
PPA;
0.0119
0.00804
0.000327
0.0136
0.131
0.673
.
1.00
11.0
0.0274
1.14
PPM;
BNP;
2.00
1.38
16.1
0.0331
2.13
BMP;
3.56 E-5 -0.00458
1.65
-6.15
0.624
2.97
HGCMOM;
9.65
11
20
0
5470
5000
INCOME78;
6440
70000
0
2.32
FSIZE;
5.86
6
15
2
IPF;
1210
1060
12500
0
1050
2120
CTMEDINC;
8320
8440
3090
13800
0.506
0.500
BLACK;
1
0
1
0.508
0
0.500
MALE;
1
1
22.9
18
5.24
RESPAGE;
21
36
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model2b
Mean
Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev Obs.
Variable
0.377
EMP; (Eqn. 22)
0.829
1
1
0
662
0.354
0.854
1
EMP; (Eqn. 23)
0
1
636
WAGE;{Eqn. 24)
8.29
1.74
4.74
542
7.00
45.70
1.41
0.909 0.0727
CPI;{Eqn. 24)
1.45
542
1.45
5.87
4.84
1.20
3.29
WAGE/CPI; (Eqn. 24)
542
31.6
L65
1.58
0.186
0.457
Log(WAGE/CPIJ (Eqn. 24)
542
3.45
HSDUM; (Eqn. 22)
0.748
1
0
0.435
1
662
HSDUM; (Eqn. 23)
0.761
1
0
0.427
636
1
0.409
HSDUM; (Eqn. 24)
0.788
1
0
542
1
0.500
MALE; (Eqn. 22)
1
0.515
0
662
1
MALE; (Eqn. 23)
0.524
0
0.500
1
1
636
MALE; (Eqn. 24)
0.506
1
0
0.500
542
1
BLACK; (Eqn. 23)
0.509
1
0
0.500
636
1
0.500
BLACK; (Eqn. 24)
0.506
1
542
0
1
HGCMOM; (Eqn. 24)
9.63
11
20
0
3.04
542
5,400
INCOME78; (Eqn. 24)
6,530
70,000
200
5,291
542
6
FSIZE; (Eqn. 24)
5.88
15
2
2.34
542
IPFj (Eqn. 24)
1,230
1,070
12,500
1,120
33.3
542
AGE; (Eqn. 23)
28.62
23
29
31
1.84
636
AGE; (Eqn. 24)
28.8
29
31
18
1.92
542
WREMP; (Eqn. 23)
491,000 254,000 3,680,000
3,730 605,000
636
WRPOP; (Eqn. 23)
4,240 788,000
648,000 347,000 472,000
636
0.0757
WREMP;lWRPOP; (Eqn. 23)
0.735
0.747
1
0.511
636
WYear; (Eqn. 22)
1991.72
1993
1993
1980
2.07
662
1981
WYear; (Eqn. 24)
1992.21
1993
1993
1.56
542
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Table 14: Regression Results for Model 2, Equations (18) - (21)
Variable
HGCi (OLS)
HSDUM (Logit) HGCi(OLS)
HSDUM(Logit)
FBPA i

Column 1

Column 2

0.247*
(0.126)

0.380**
(0.194)

BNPi
BMPi
HGCMOM
IPFi

0.0929***
(0.0251)
0.000170**
(6.78E-05)

INCOME78 i
-CTMEDINCi
BLACKi
MALEi
RESPONSEAGE
l8i
RESPAGEi
AGE_14i
AGE_15i
AGE_16i
AGE_17i

Adjusted RL
Log Likelihood

-0.000214***
(5.42E-05)
0.231
(0.178)
-0.215
(0.137)
-0.525***
(0.200)
0.1216***
(0.0150)
10.114
(0.760)
10.227
(0.725)
10.788
(0.718)
10.591
(0.726)
0.192
-1397

0.0838**
(0.0356)

7.76E-05***
(2.86E-05)
-0.000268***
(7.67E-05)
0.587**
(0.250)
-0.627***
(0.198)
-0.686**
(0.273)
0.0349
(0.0233)
1.106
(1.12)
0.892
(1.071)
1.835
(1.06)
1.74
(1.07)
-336

Column 3

Column 4

0.156*
(0.0813)
0.0176
(0.351)
0.0926***
(0.0252)
0.000169**
(6.79E-05)

0.217*
(0.120)
0.226
(0.552)
0.0839**
(0.0356)

7.76E-05***
(2.86E-05)
-0.000213*** -0.000269***
(5.43E-05)
(7.68E-05)
0.231
0.588**
(0.178)
(0.250)
-0.218
-0.625***
(0.137)
(0.199)
-0.523***
-0.687**
(0.200)
(0.273)
0.122***
0.0349
(0.0150)
(0.0233)
10.107
1.10
(0.760)
(1.12)
10.208
0.896
(0.728)
(1.072)
10.778
1.84
(0.719)
(1.06)
1.74
10.582
(1.07)
(0.726)
0.191
-1397
-336

Regressions using restricted sample of 716 NLSY79 respondents.
Coefficients for birth-state dummies not shown.
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Table 15: Regression Results for Model 2: Log Fonnulation, Equations (19) - (21)
Variable
HGCj (OLS)
HSDUM; (Logit) HGC;(OLS)
HSDUM;(Logit)
LFBPA;

Column.}

Column. 2

-0.254
(0.154)

-0.424**
(0.215)

LBNPj
LBMP j
HGCMOM;
LIPFj

0.105**
(0.0254)
0.125
(0.113)

LINCOME78j
LCTMEDINCj
BLACKj
MALE;
RESPONSEAGE
18j
RESPAClEj
AGE_14j
AGE_15 j
AGE_I6j
AGE_17;

Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood

-1.70***
(0.420)
0.241
(0.179)
-0.224*
(0.138)
-0.547**
(0.200)
0.117***
(0.0150)
2354
(3.84)
23.30
(3.84) .
23.42
(3.84)
22.87
J3.86)
0.187
-1397

0.985***
(0.359)

0.333**
(0.161)
-2.13***
(0.611J
0.572**
(0.247)
-0.643***
(0.199)
-0.716***
(0.271)
0.0255
(0.0230)
16.57
(5.74)
15.86
(5.73)
16.08
(5.74)
15.39
(5.74)
-338

Column 3

Column 4

-0.0639
(0.135)
-0.287
(0.291)
0.105***
(0.0254)
0.126
(0.113)

-0.102
(0.195)
-0.493
(0.432)
0.0984***
(0.0360)

--1.70***
(0.420)
0.242
(0.179)
-0.223
(0.138)
-0.551 ***
(0.201)
0.117***
(0.0150)
24.58
(4.25)
24.38
(4.28)
24.59
(4.35)
24.11
(4.42)
0.186
-1397

0.334**
(0.161)
-2.11 ***
(0.610)
0.575***
(0.248)
-0.641 ***
(0.199)
-0.724***
(0.272)
0.0260
(0.0230)
18.29
(6.27)
17.65
(6.31)
18.01
(6.41)
17.43
(6.45)
-338

Regressions using restricted sample of716 NLSY79 respondents.
Coefficients for birth-state dummies not shown.
LBNPj and LBMP; represent the sum and the difference,
respectively, of FBPA; and PPA;.
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Table 16: Regression Results for Model 2, Equations (22) - (24)
Variable
log(WAGE/CPIJ (OLS)
EMP; (Logit)
EMP j (Logit)
Column 2

Column 1

C

HSDUM;
MALE·l

-3.55**
(1.63)
0.697*
(0.399)
0.971 **
(0.383)

-18.4***
(2.89)
0.875***
(0.267)
0.685***
(0.256)
-0.694**
(0.322)

BLACK;
HGCMOM; .
IPFj

0.609***
(0.0807)
3.44*
(1.95)

WAGEAGEj
WREMP/WRPOP j

Adjusted R:l
Log Likelihood
Observations

-122
662

-216
636

Column 3

0.203
(0.340)
0.224***
(0.0476)
0.166***
(0.0385)
-0.138***
(0.0503)
0.0223***
(0.00671)
2.91 E-5
(1.84 E-5)
0.0378***
(0.0113)

0.216
-232
542

Coefficients for year-, state-of-residence-, and birth-state-dummies for Equation (22) not
shown. Coefficients for state-of-residence- and birth-state-dummies for Equation (24) not
shown. Equation (23) did not include these dummies.
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Table 17: Year- and State-Dummy Coefficients For Equation (14)
Years 1974 and 1975 and New York State omitted for comnarison

Var.

APEs"

(r.nt'r!)

Variable

APEs"

Var.

Var.

APEs"

(cnt'r!)

APEs"

IN

3.15
(107)

NC

3.75*
(? 0,\)

(r.nt'r!)

1976

-0.204
(LOn

1993

3.20**
(1Ao)

IA

3.83*
(1.9q)

ND

3.65*
(1 QQ)

1977

0.261
(1.17)

1994

3.53**
(1.4n

KS

2.78
(200)

OH

1.69
(?o(:;)

1978

-0.149
(11 q)

1995

3.73***
(1.4n

KY

3.72*
(2.11)

OK

0.831
(2.08)

1979

1.15
(1.21)

AL

4.53**
(2.10)

LA

3.83*
(Iqq)

OR

4.09**
(107)

1980

1.32
(1.24)

AK

-0.651
(100)

ME

4.09**
(100)

PN

2.84
(7 om

1981

2.90**
(I.23)

AZ

4.38**
(1 1e))

MD

4.10**
(1m)

RI

-0.143
nom

1982

3.16**
(1.26)

AR

3.49*
(10'\)

MA

4.46**
(701)

SC

4.43**
no,;)

1983

3.46***
(1.2&)

CA

4.17*
(2.32)

MI

3.51
(117)

SD

-2.80
(1 04)

1984

3.35**
(1.30)

CO

6.18***
(2.05)

MN

4.79**
(10n

TN

5.23**
(1 14)

1985

2.64**
(1.11)

CT

-3.70*
(2.10)

MS

4.28**
(2.17)

TX

5.25***
nom

1986

3.32**
(111)

DE

2.38
(2.0m

MO

2.53
(2.on

UT

5.42**
(? ;:1,\)

1987

3.40**
(1.14)

DC

1.50
(1on

MT

-3.42*
(19q)

VT

4.25**
(?.Oln

1988

3.07**
(1.38)

FL

4.12**
(1 or,;)

NE

2.36
(2.01)

VA

-0.689
(1.99)

1989

2.85**
(1.41)

GA

4.92**
(2.09)

NY

4.90**
(1 1(:;)

WA

6.29***
(11n

1990

3.33**
(140)

HI

6.58***
(2.1&)

NH

1.36
(1 qq)

WV

2.71
(700)

1991

2.96**
(J.4n

ID

0.0959
(11 (';)

NJ

1.94
(2.04)

WI

-0.0843
(1 QQ)

1992

3.63***
(1.39)

IL

2.37
(707)

NM

5.53***

WY

1.19
(? o?)

(201))

Table 18: State-Dummy Coefficients For Equation (19)

Variable

HSDUM;

Var.

HSDUM;

AL

0.966

KY

-1.68

Var.

HSDUM;

AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT,
DC
FL
GA
IL

IN
IA

KS

New York State omitted for
comparison. Restricted Sample did
not include respondents from
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, or Wyoming.

Variable

EMP;

1993

7.16

1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981

Table 19: Year-, State-of-Residence-, and Birth-StateDummy Coefficients For Equation 22
Variable

EMP;

CO

1.77

Var.

EMP;

Var.

New York omitted for comparison. All other omitted
states left out due to perfect multicollinearity.

EMP;

Var.

EMP;

Table 20: State-of-Residence- and Birth-State Dummy Coefficients For Equation 24
Var.

New York omitted for
comparison. All other
omitted states left out due to
perfect multicollinearity.

Log(WAGE;

Var.

Log(WAGE;

Var.
Var.

Log(WAGE;I

Log(WAGE;

o
o

AL

-0.265

Table 21: Rates of Return on 10-Year T-Bills Versus SBP, 1968-1994
Year Annualized
return on
10-Year TBills
(10YTB)
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

5.65
6.67
7.35
6.16
6.21
6.84
7.56
7.99
7.61
7.42
8.41
9.44
11.46
13.91
13.00
11.10
12.44
10.62
7.68
8.39
8.85
8.49
8.55
7.86
7.01
5.87
7.09

Inflation
Rate

4.2
5.5
5.7
4.4
3.2
6.2
11

9.1
5.8
6.5
7.6
11.3
15.5
10.3
6.2
3.2
4.3
3.6
1.9
3.6
4.1
4.8
5.4
4.2
3.0
3.0
2.6

Real
10YTB
Real
Interest
Value of Cumulative
Value of
Rate $110YTB
$1 Spent
Minus Purchased
Inflation
in 1968 on SBP in
Divided
1968
by 100
0.015
0.0
1.02
0.0
0.012
1.03
0.017
0.0
1.04
0.018
0.0
1.06
0.030
0.0
1.08
0.0
0.006
1.11
-0.034
1.12
0.0
-0.011
1.08
0.0
1.07
0.0
0.018
0.0
0.009
1.09
1.09
0.0
0.008
0.0
-0.019
1.10
-0.040
1.08
1.40
. 2.70
1.04
0.036
4.20
0.068
1.08
1.15
5.90
0.079
1.24
7.80
0.081
9.80
1.34
0.070
1.44
11.90
0.058
14.00
0.048
1.52
16.10
0.048
1.59
18.30
0.037
1.67
20.30
0.032
1.73
22.40
0.037
1.78
24.60
0.040
1.85
27.00
1.92
0.029
29.20
0.045
1.98
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Real
Cumulative
Value of$l
Spent on
NewSBP
Participants
in 1968
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.30
0.59
0.91
1.27
1.67
2.11
2.55
3.00
3.45
3.91
4.36
4.80
5.27
5.78
6.25

Glossary of Variables for Empirical Models: Modell
BPEs,t - Total SBP breakfasts served in the state that year divided by total enrollment in
SBP schools. This variable is defined mathematically as BKTOTs,t / SBPENROLLs,t.
BKTOTs,t - Total SBP breakfasts served in the state that year
APEs,t - 1808 times Average Daily Attendance (ADA) in SBP schools in the state that
year divided by Enrollment in SBP schools in the state that year. This variable is defined
mathematically as 180*SBPADAs,t / SBPENROLLs,t
ENROLLs,t- Total enrollment in the public schools K-12 in the state that year. This
includes SBP schools and non-SBP schools. Because some private schools offer the
SBP, it is conceivable that SBPENROLLs,t would exceed ENROLLs,t. Nevertheless,
ENROLLs,t is always greater than or equal to SBPENROLL s,( in our data set.
LBPEs,t - Natural log of the quotient of total SBP breakfasts divided by enrollment in
SBP schools. This variable is the natural log of B PEs,(, and i,s equal to the difference in
the natural logs ofBKTOTs,t and SBPENROLLs,t.
LAPEs,t - Natural log of the quotient of 180* ADA in SBP schools and Enrollment in
SBP schools. This variab lIe is the natural log of APEs,t and is equal to Log(180) +
Log(SBPADAs,t) - Log(SBPENROLLs,t).
LBMPs,t - Difference of the natural logs of BPEs,t and PPEs,t. When we regress LAPEs,t
on both this variable and LBNPs,t, the coefficient for LBMPs,/ represents the effect of
increasing the number of breakfasts served while holding the number of participants
constant. Mathematically, this variable represents Log(BKTOTs,t) - Log(180) Log(PARTICIPs,t).
LBNPs,t - Sum of the natural logs of BPEs,t and PPEs,t. When we regress LAPEs,( on both
this variable and LBMPs,,, the coefficient for LBNPs,t r~presents the effect of increasing
the number of participants served while holding the number of breakfasts per participant
constant. Mathematically, this variable represents Log(BKTOTs,t) + Log(180) +
Log(PARTICIPs,t) - 2*Log(SBPENROLLs,t).
LPPEs,t - The natural log of 180 times participants, or "participant days," divided by
enrollment in SBP schools. This number will always be greater than or equal to LBPEs,t.
Mathematically, we represent this variable as Log(180) + Log(PARTICIPs,() Log(SBPENROLLs,t).
LTPENRs,t - The natural log of the state teacher-pupil ratio. Mathematically represented
as Log(TEACHERSs,t) - Log(ENROLLs,t).

a The length ofa school year varies by school. We select 180 as a rough estimate of the average number of
school days per year.
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PARTICIPs,t - The number of SBP participants in the state that year. This variable
counts students in the state who ate anywhere between 1 and 180 breakfasts that year.
This variable will always be less than or equal to SBPENR OLL s,t. Moreover, 180 times
this variable will always be greater than or equal to BKTOTs,t.
PPEs,t - 180 times participants, or "participant days," divided by enrollment. This
variable counts the number of times when a participant could have eaten breakfast. This
variable will always be greater than or equal to BPEs,t. Mathematically represented as
180 * PARTICIPs,t/ SBPENROLLs,t.
SBPADAs,t- Average Daily Attendance (ADA) in SBP schools. This variable does not
represent ADA over the year. Instead, this variable represents ADA in SBP schools in
the state-year observation over the peak month nationally.
SBPENROLLs,t - Total enrollment in SBP schools in the state that year.
States,d- State dummy. Returns a "I" for an observation in state s and a "0" otherwise.
TEACHERSs,t - Total number of teachers in public schools K-12 in the state that year.
Part-time teachers are added as fractions of full-time teachers.
TPENRs,t - Teachers divided by enrollment in public schools K-12 in the state that year.
We use this variable to proxy for the teacher-pupil ratio in SBP schools in the state that
year. As noted in the write-up, the coefficient for TPENRs,t underestimates the effect of
changing the teacher-pupil ratio in SBP schools in a given state and year.
Mathematically represented as TEACHERSs,t / ENROLLs,t.
Yeart,d - Year dummy. Returns a "1" for an observation in year t and a "0" otherwise.
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Glossary of Variables for Empirical Models: Model 2
ADAKT2; - The sum of Average Daily Attendance (ADA) in public schools in the
respondents' state of birth for the years in which the respondent was 5, 6, and 7 years old.
We expect that the respondent entered kindergarten at age 5. Hence, these years
represent the years when the respondent attended kindergarten, 1st grade, and 2nd grade.
Henceforth, we will refer to this period as the years from K-2.
AGE XX;- Cohort dummy. Returns a "I" if the respondent was:XX years old in 1979
and a "0" otherwise. Our restricted sample includes respondents who were aged 14-17 in
1979.
BLA CK; - Race dummy. Returns a "1" if the respondent is black and a "0" otherwise.

BOTHPARENTS; - Nuclear family dummy. Returns a "I" if the respondent lived with
both parents from birth until age 18 and a "0" otherwise. The original NLSY79 did not
include this question. Respondents answered this question in a follow-up survey in 1988.
FBPA; - The sum of free breakfasts in respondent i's state over the years from K-2
divided by the sum of ADA in respondent i's state over the years from K-2.
Mathematically represented as FREEBKi / ADAKT2 i.
BPM; - FBPAi divided by its own mean.
BMP; - The difference of FBPAi divided by its mean and PPAi divided by its mean.
BMPi and BNPi serve the same purpose as do LBMPs,t and LBNPs,t in Modell. When we
regress HGCi on BNPi and BMPi simultaneously, we obtain coefficients u\ and U2,
respectively. U2 represents the effect on HGCi of changing the relative sizes of FBPAi and
PPA j • The same applies when we regress HSDUM;. Mathematically, we define BMPi as
FBPA i / Mean(FBPA j ) -PPA j / Mean(PPA j ).
BNP; - The sum of FBPAi divided by its mean and PPAi divided by its mean. When we
regress HGC j on BNPj and BMPi simultaneously, we obtain coefficients u\ and U2,
respectively. Ul represents the combined effect on HGCi of changing FBPA j and PPA j
simultaneously. At the mean values for FBPA j and PPA j, U\ represents the combined
effect on HGC i of changing FBPAi andPPA j simultaneously in equal proportions. The
same applies when we regress HSDUMj • Mathematically, we define BNP j as FBPA; /
Mean(FBPA j ) + PPA j / Mean(PPA j ).
BState;,$ - Birth-state dummy. Returns a "1" if the respondent was born in state s and a
"0" otherwise. Our sample only includes those respondents who lived in their respective
birth states at age 14.

Cohort;,t - Vector of cohort dummies AGE_14; through AGE_17;.
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CPI; - Consumer Price Index for WYear;. The average price level from 1992 to 1994 is
scaled to equal 100.
CTMEDINC; - Median family income in respondent i's county of birth in 1966. Note
that respondent i's county of birth is not necessarily respondent i' s county of residence at
age 14.
EMP; - Returns a one if the respondent was employed in the survey year and a zero
otherwise. Survey year determined by most recent response to WAGE;.
FREEBK; - The sum of free SBP breakfasts served in respondent i's state for the years
K-2. SBP schools provide free breakfasts to all interested students living at 130%
poverty or below.
FSIZE; - The size of respondenti' s family in 1979. Does not exceed 16.
HGC; - The highest grade (0 -20) that respondent i completed. Every follow-up survey
in the NLSY79 included this question. We take each respondent's most recent answer to
this question.
HGCMOMi - The highest grade (0-20) that respondent i's mother completed. This
variable typically exercises a significant effect on a given student' s educational
attainment. Father's education level does not typically exercise a significant effect on a
student's attainnient; Moreover, many of our respondent' s did not know their father's
education level.
HISPANIC; - Race dummy. Returns a "1" if the respondent is Hispanic and a "0"
otherwise.
INCOME78; - Respondent ;'s family income in 1978. Out sample only includes
respondents who lived with their parents in 1979. Hence, we assume that family income
in 1978 includes parents' income.
IPF;- Respondent's family income in 1978 divided by family size in 1979. INCOME78;
tells us more about respondent ;' s parents, while IPF tells us more about the resources
available to the respondent as a child.

MALE; - Sex dummy. Returns a "I" if the respondent is male and a "0" otherwise.
MOMA GE; - Age of respondent i's mother in 1987. Less than half of the respondents
answered this question. The original NLSY79 survey did not include this question.
Respondents answered this question in a follow-up survey in 1987.
PART; - The sum of the number of participants in the SBP in respondent i's state for the
years K-2.
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PPA; - The sum over the years K-2 of the number ofSBP participants in respondent i's
state divided by the sum over the years K-2 of ADA in respondent j's state.
Mathematically represented as PARTj / ADAKT2 j •
PPM; - PPA j divided by its own mean.
RESPA GE; - Respondent j's age when he or she most recently reported highest grade
completed. This variable ranges from 18 to 36. Our sample omits every respondent who
did not report highest grade completed after age 17.
RESPONSEAGE_18;-Age 18 dummy. Returns a "I" if the respondent was 18 years
old when he or she reported highest grade completed and "0" otherwise.
RState;,s - State-of-residence-dummy. Returns a "1" if respondent i lived in state s in
WYearj and a "0" otherwise.
SBPADAKT2; - The sum over the years K-2 of ADA in SBP schools in respondent i's
state.
WAGE; - Respondent i's most recent answer to the question: "What is the wage rate of
your current or most recent job?"
WREMPj - The number of employed persons in respondent i's race and age-group in
respondent i's state of residence in WYearj~
WREMPi - Population in respondent i's race and age-group in respondent i's state of
residence in WYearj.
WYear; - The year of respondent i's most recent wage response.
WYear;,t - Wage year-dummies. Returns a "1" if WYearj = t and a "0" otherwise.
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